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Samuel D. Brunson* 
Nineteenth-century American religious movements challenged many 
aspects of American society.  Although their challenges to mainstream America’s 
vision of sex and marriage remain the best-known aspects of many of these 
groups, their challenges to traditional American economics are just as 
important.  Eschewing individual ownership of property, many of these new 
Christian movements followed the New Testament model of a body of believers 
that held all property in common. 
In the early twentieth century, these religious communal groups had to 
contend with something new: an income tax.  Communalism did not fit into the 
individualistic economic system envisioned by the drafters of the income tax.  So 
Congress designed a special tax regime, now codified in section 501(d) of the 
Internal Revenue Code, which exempts religious communal holding companies 
from tax, while imputing the holding companies’ income to the members of the 
group.  Section 501(d) provides communitarian groups with flexibility to reflect 
their unusual economics. 
There exist, however, a number of problems with the design and 
implementation of section 501(d).  This Article will survey the three principal 
problems.  The first is scope: under current law, only religious communitarian 
groups can elect to use the section 501(d) regime.  Second is uncertainty and 
vagueness in the statute.  Third is I.R.S. overreach in the enforcement, applying 
doctrines (such as the public policy doctrine) that do not apply to section 501(d).  
In this Article, I discuss why and how to remedy these problems, while not 
opening section 501(d) to abusive tax avoidance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Nineteenth-century America saw the emergence of a number of 
charismatic religious movements set on rejecting the wicked world 
surrounding them and restoring primitive Christianity.1  For some of 
these religious movements, rejecting the wicked world also meant 
jettisoning central values of the surrounding culture.  Radically, a 
number of these religious movements rejected the sexual and familial 
mores of nineteenth-century America.2  The Shakers, for example, 
eschewed sex, choosing to live celibate lives.3  The Mormons rejected 
monogamy in favor of polygamy.4  And the Oneida community 
 
 1  LAWRENCE FOSTER, RELIGION AND SEXUALITY: THE SHAKERS, THE MORMONS, AND 
THE ONEIDA COMMUNITY 5–6 (1984). 
 2  LOUIS J. KERN, AN ORDERED LOVE: SEX ROLES AND SEXUALITY IN VICTORIAN 
UTOPIAS—THE SHAKERS, THE MORMONS, AND THE ONEIDA COMMUNITY xii (1981) (“With 
the exception of slavery, no area of nineteenth-century life commanded as much 
attention and consumed as a much reform energy as questions of sex, marriage, and 
the family. . . . [T]he pantagamous Oneida Community . . . the polygamic Mormons . . . 
and the celibate Shakers . . . consciously sought to provide social alternatives to 
monogamous marriage.”). 
 3  Ralph Michael Stein, A Sect Apart: A History of the Legal Troubles of the Shakers, 23 
ARIZ. L. REV. 735, 739 (1981).  
 4  Janet Bennion, History, Culture, and Variability of Mormon Schismatic Groups, in 
MODERN POLYGAMY IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORICAL, CULTURAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES 
101, 102 (Cardell K. Jacobson & Lara Burton eds., 2011); Samuel D. Brunson, Taxing 
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embraced “complex marriage,” a type of group marriage that “resulted 
in radical changes in sex roles and behavior.”5 
Of course, while rejecting the surrounding world’s marital and 
sexual norms represents perhaps the most memorable feature of these 
restorationist Christian movements, they did not view the wicked 
world’s sexual and marital practices as its only objectionable practices.  
And while the groups’ alternative approaches to sex and marriage may 
be the most salacious part of their rejection of the surrounding culture, 
their new sexual and marital practices were neither the most 
interesting nor the most important way in which they differed from the 
mainstream culture.  Equally interesting, and far more successful, was 
their approach to economic life. 
The Shakers, the Mormons, and the Oneida community—as well 
as many other nineteenth-century religious groups6—implemented 
some version of economic communitarianism,7 attempting to recreate 
the Apostolic society of the New Testament.8  Eschewing the private 
ownership of property, they instead gave their private property to—
and subjugated their selfish desires for—the benefit of a group, which, 
in turn, provided them with sustenance and community.  This 
voluntary self-denial, while central to the project of communalism,9 is 
broadly inimical to the myth of individualism so foundational to 
Americans’ understanding of themselves.10 
Although their communitarian practices violated American 
economic norms, the country ultimately tolerated—and, in fact, 
 
Polygamy, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 113, 131 n.112 (2013) [hereinafter Brunson, Taxing 
Polygamy]. 
 5  FOSTER, supra note 1, at 5.  
 6  See CHRIS JENNINGS, PARADISE NOW: THE STORY OF AMERICAN UTOPIANISM 7 (2016) 
(“At least one hundred experimental [communalist] communities were founded in 
the United States during the nineteenth century and countless more since.”). 
 7  LAWRENCE FOSTER, WOMEN, FAMILY, AND UTOPIA: COMMUNAL EXPERIMENTS OF THE 
SHAKERS, THE ONEIDA COMMUNITY, AND THE MORMONS xiv (1991). 
 8  According to the Bible, the early Apostolic church practiced communitarian 
economics.  Believers did not claim private ownership over their assets, but instead, 
they held everything in common.  Acts 4:32.  Upon joining, these early Christians sold 
whatever assets they had and gave the proceeds to the apostles, who then distributed 
those assets by need.  Acts 4:32–35; see also Acts 2:44–45.  As a result of this communal 
living, “there was not a needy person among” these early Christians.  Acts 4:34. 
 9  TIMOTHY MILLER, THE QUEST FOR UTOPIA IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA: 
VOLUME 1: 1900–1960, at xx (1998) [hereinafter MILLER, QUEST FOR UTOPIA] 
(“Communitarianism is predicated upon some degree of suppression of individualism 
and the pursuit of the common, not just the individual, good.”). 
 10  See, e.g., PETER L CALLERO, THE MYTH OF INDIVIDUALISM: HOW SOCIAL FORCES 
SHAPE OUR LIVES 18 (2d ed. 2013) (“American society is saturated with the holy waters 
of individualism.”). 
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accommodated—this particular religiously-inspired difference.11  In 
the early twentieth century, the U.S. introduced a federal income tax 
that could have devastated communitarian societies.  Communalism 
did not fit into the individualistic economic system envisioned by the 
drafters of the income tax.  At the same time, though, these 
communitarian groups engaged in commerce, so, unlike churches and 
other public charities, they did not belong entirely outside of the tax 
system.  After a quarter-century of uneasy engagement with the tax 
system, Congress drafted a tax provision applicable solely to these 
religious communitarian groups. 
There is nothing unusual about drafting tax provisions targeted 
at small groups, of course.  Congress continually enacts this type of 
legislation.12  That such targeted tax provisions are common, though, 
hardly serves to recommend them: even Congress recognizes that 
“[t]argeted tax provisions based on narrow social and economic goals 
(as distinguished from revenue raising)” form the heart of tax 
complexity.13  And this provision—now codified in section 501(d) of 
the Internal Revenue Code (“section 501(d)”)—currently applies to 
just over 200 communal groups and their members.14 
Unlike many targeted tax provisions, though, section 501(d) 
probably does not add significant complexity to the tax law.  Because 
it is targeted at very few taxpayers, section 501(d) remains relatively 
obscure, largely ignored, and unknown by the population at large.  It 
also solves a very real problem that the existence of these groups 
creates: how to apply a tax regime that assumes individuality and 
selfishness to taxpayers who eschew such things. 
Still, its obscurity, as well as its mischaracterization as a tax 
exemption, have caused the Internal Revenue Service (“I.R.S.”) to 
radically misunderstand section 501(d).  As a result of its 
misunderstanding both the economic function and the application of 
section 501(d), the I.R.S. has imported requirements from the world 
 
 11  By way of contrast, U.S. law and culture largely have not embraced these groups’ 
alternative sexual and marital practices.  See, e.g., Brunson, Taxing Polygamy, supra note 
4, at 114–15. 
 12  Kristin E. Hickman, Administering the Tax System We Have, 63 DUKE L.J. 1717, 
1722 (2014).  
 13  Ad Hoc Comm. on Tax Reform, Tax Reform: The Business Perspective, 41 BUS. LAW. 
907, 908 (1986). 
 14  In 2015, there were 217 recognized religious and apostolic groups that were 
exempt under section 501(d).  I.R.S., 2015 DATA BOOK 58 tbl. 25 (2016), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/15databk.pdf.  The number of exempt 
communitarian religious organizations had increased significantly since the beginning 
of the century, from 131 in 2002.  I.R.S., 2003 DATA BOOK 30 tbl. 22 (2003), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/03databk.pdf.  
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of tax-exempt public charities that have no place in taxing 
communitarian groups. 
Even if the I.R.S. properly understood the place of section 501(d), 
the provision has two significant problems that Congress or the 
Treasury Department needs to address.  The first problem is scope: 
under current law, only religious communal groups can elect to use 
the section 501(d) regime.  This makes sense from a historical 
perspective: Congress was trying to fix a problem for certain religious 
communal groups when it passed section 501(d).  Today, though, 
outside of its history, there is no tax policy reason—compelling or 
otherwise—to bar secular communitarian groups from also qualifying 
for exemption under section 501(d). 
Second, although section 501(d) is a short provision of the tax 
law, consisting of only one hundred words, several of its key 
requirements remain undefined and ambiguous.  As a result, 
uncertainty exists for many organizations over whether they qualify for 
the exemption.  In some cases, that uncertainty may prevent a qualified 
communitarian organization from applying for exemption under 
section 501(d).  In other cases, it has led to litigation.15 
This Article will highlight the beneficial uses and potential of 
section 501(d), while at the same time proposing correctives to the 
problems of section 501(d).  Part II will present a case study illustrating 
the I.R.S.’s misunderstanding of section 501(d), with the I.R.S. 
conflating the sexual and the economic aspects of communitarian 
organizations.  Because the I.R.S. misunderstands the purpose and the 
place of communitarian organizations, it over-enforces qualification 
criteria that do not and need not apply, unnecessarily limiting the 
types of organizations that should be able to elect the special tax 
treatment provided by section 501(d). 
In Part III, this Article will review the history of communitarian 
organizations—both religious and non-religious—in the United 
States.  Part IV will proceed to follow the developments in the taxation 
of communitarian organizations, from courts’ initial rejection of their 
charitable status to Congress’s enactment of a specialized exemption 
for certain religious communitarian organizations. 
In Part V, the Article will explore whether the Internal Revenue 
Code (“the Code”) needs a special provision for communitarian 
organizations, or if the existence of such a provision adds unnecessary 
complexity to the Code.  The Article will do so by analyzing how three 
 
 15  See, e.g., Twin Oaks Cmty., Inc. v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1233, 1242 (1986) (I.R.S. 
argued that members must take “vow of poverty” for organization to qualify as having 
communal or community treasury), acq., 1987-2 C.B. 1. 
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other tax regimes would apply to communitarian groups and 
evaluating whether those regimes could accurately reflect the 
economics of these organizations. 
Part VI will then suggest a number of changes Congress should 
make to improve and modernize section 501(d).  Most importantly, 
Congress should extend the exemption to non-religious 
communitarian organizations.  In addition, though, there are a 
handful of ambiguities and tax-planning opportunities in the rules that 
Congress could easily repair.  Part VI will discuss those improvements 
that Congress could, and should, make. 
II. I.R.S. OVERREACH IN SECTION 501(D) 
Under section 501(d), a qualifying “religious or apostolic” 
organization with a common or community treasury can elect to be 
exempt from tax.16  The exemption is not complete, though: although 
the communitarian organization itself pays no taxes, its members do 
pay taxes on their pro rata share of the organization’s income, whether 
or not it distributes that income to them.17 
For tax purposes, then, section 501(d) organizations function 
more like pass-through entities than tax-exempt entities.  Still, the fact 
that the special tax provision speaks of exemption and is located in the 
same section of the Code as other tax exemptions appears to have 
caused the I.R.S. to misapprehend the history and economic substance 
of the provision.  In a 2013 private letter ruling, the I.R.S. held that a 
polygamous group failed to qualify as an exempt religious or apostolic 
organization because polygamy is both illegal and contrary to public 
policy.18  The public policy requirement does not, however, apply to 
exemptions under section 501(d).  Furthermore, no tax policy reason 
justifies importing such a requirement into this exemption from 
taxation.19 
Nonetheless, whether from a lack of understanding about the 
unique economics of section 501(d), from pure administrative 
overreach, or for some other reason, the I.R.S. has imposed 
qualification requirements on religious and apostolic organizations 
that do not derive either from the Code or the case law.  Moreover, 
 
 16  I.R.C. § 501(d) (2015). 
 17  Id.  For a discussion of the definitions of religious or apostolic, common or community 
treasury, and pro rata as used in section 501(d), see infra Part VI.A-B. 
 18  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-10-047 (Mar. 8, 2013).  
 19  Although this Article will briefly review the history and the scope of the public 
policy doctrine, an in-depth analysis of the doctrine is beyond the scope of this Article 
and will, instead, be treated in a future article. 
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because communitarian organizations may lack the resources to 
challenge the I.R.S.’s determination, these administrative overreaches 
can potentially continue unchallenged.20  As long as the I.R.S. reads an 
inapplicable public policy requirement into section 501(d), it will 
unnecessarily discourage organizations that should elect this 
exemption from doing so. 
A. History of Public Policy Requirement 
The public policy requirement provides that an organization 
seeking “charitable tax subsidies . . . may not engage in activities 
antithetical to established public policy.”21  This requirement does not 
find its roots either in the Code or in the Treasury regulations.  Rather, 
it originated in the District Court for the District of Columbia’s 
decision in Green v. Kennedy.22  The plaintiffs in that case consisted of 
African American parents living in Mississippi whose children had 
been denied entrance into private schools because of their race.23  The 
plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction preventing the I.R.S. from 
granting a tax exemption to racially discriminatory schools and from 
permitting donors to such schools to deduct their donations, as well as 
requiring the I.R.S. to revoke the exemptions already granted to 
racially discriminatory schools.24 
The court found that, although the exemption and deductions 
did not involve direct tuition grants by the government, they did 
provide “substantial and significant support by the Government to the 
segregated private school[s].”25  In fact, the tax exemption and 
deduction available to donors significantly aided the private schools in 
raising funds, and thus, in discriminating.26  Although the court did 
not require the I.R.S. to revoke the exemptions of racially 
 
 20  See Samuel D. Brunson, Watching the Watchers: Preventing I.R.S. Abuse of the Tax 
System, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 223, 232 (2013) (“[P]olicing [the I.R.S.] imposes a cost—
potentially significant—on taxpayers.  As a result of this cost, they may not have 
sufficient incentive to challenge the I.R.S.’s misinterpretations, even when they have a 
strong case.”). 
 21  Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of 
Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505, 532 (2010). 
 22  Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970). 
 23  Id. at 1129. 
 24  Id. at 1130. 
 25  Id. at 1134. 
 26  Id. at 1135.  In fact, fundraising letters from the schools to potential donors 
emphasized that without their (tax-deductible) support, “many students, whose minds 
and bodies are just as pure as those of any of their classmates and playmates . . . w[ill] 
be forced into one of the intolerable and repugnant ‘other schools,’” or forced into 
dropping out altogether.  Id. 
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discriminatory schools that had already received their tax exemption, 
it decided that a “broad public interest” existed in enjoining the I.R.S. 
from granting tax-exempt status to such schools during the pendency 
of the litigation.27 
Shortly after the court issued its preliminary injunction, the I.R.S. 
announced that it could no longer provide a tax exemption to racially 
discriminatory private schools or allow taxpayers to deduct their 
donations to such schools.28  Randolph W. Thrower, the Commissioner 
of the I.R.S., clarified the I.R.S.’s position, explaining that an 
organization seeking tax-exemption and deductible donations under 
sections 501(c)(3) and 170 of the Code had to meet the common law 
tests for being “charitable.”29 
The following year, when the district court decided the case on its 
merits, the court adopted the I.R.S.’s focus on “charitable.”30  Section 
501(c)(3) uses “[t]he term charitable . . . in its generally accepted legal 
sense”;31 as a result, at least for close questions, the court could look to 
the common law of charitable trusts.32  Central to the law of charitable 
trusts is the concept that such a trust must “serve the general welfare 
and be ‘beneficial to the community.’”33 
According to the court, however, community benefit changes over 
time, making it impossible to formalize criteria with which to identify 
appropriate benefits.34  Thus, analyzing a charitable trust’s community 
benefit requires courts to take into account contemporary mores.35  
However, to qualify as serving the general welfare and benefiting the 
community, a charitable trust’s purpose cannot be “illegal or contrary 
to public policy.”36 
The common law prohibition on charities engaging in acts that 
are illegal or contrary to public policy also informs Congressional 
 
 27  Id. at 1138. 
 28  The I.R.S. announced its changed policy in two news releases, dated July 10 and 
July 19, 1970.  The news releases are reprinted in the Senate testimony of I.R.S. 
Commissioner Randolph W. Thrower on equal educational opportunity.  See Equal 
Educational Opportunity: Hearings Before the Select Comm. on Equal Educational Opportunity 
of the United States Senate, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1996–97 (1970) (statement of Randolph 
W. Thrower, Comm’r of Internal Revenue Service). 
 29  Id. at 1995. 
 30  Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1157 (D.D.C. 1971), aff’d, 404 U.S. 997 
(1971).  
 31  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (2014) (emphasis added).  
 32  Connally, 330 F. Supp. at 1157. 
 33  Id. at 1158. 
 34  Id. 
 35  Id. at 1159. 
 36  Id. 
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intent with respect to deductions and tax exemption.37  The charitable 
exemption and charitable deduction could not be used to frustrate 
explicit federal policy, including policy on racial discrimination.38  
Thus, in holding that the I.R.S. could not grant a tax exemption to 
racially discriminatory private schools, the court imported the public 
policy requirement from the common law of charitable trusts into the 
tax exemption and deduction for public charities. 
In 1971, the I.R.S. issued a revenue ruling formally adopting the 
policy that racially discriminatory private schools did not qualify as tax-
exempt under section 501(c)(3).39  Underlying this rule, the I.R.S. 
explained, was the common law of charities.  The common law 
definition of “charity,” the I.R.S. explained, encompassed all three 
major categories of exempt organizations listed in section 501(c)(3): 
charitable, educational, and religious.40  Although federal law did not 
prohibit private schools from discriminating, well-settled federal policy 
discouraged such discrimination.41  The common law prohibited 
charitable trusts of any kind from acting contrary to public policy.42  As 
such, the I.R.S. could not grant tax-exempt status under section 
501(c)(3) to private schools that discriminated on racial grounds.43 
In 1970, the I.R.S. requested proof from private schools that they 
followed nondiscriminatory admissions processes.44  Bob Jones 
University, a private religious school in Greenville, South Carolina, 
told the I.R.S. that it did not admit African Americans, and, in 
September 1971, further asserted that it would not admit African 
American students.45  The I.R.S. initiated proceedings to revoke the 
university’s tax exemption.46  Bob Jones University filed suit for 
injunctive relief, however, blocking the I.R.S.’s preparation.47  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the Anti-Injunction Act 
blocked the suit,48 and, in January 1976, the I.R.S. revoked Bob Jones 
 
 37  Id. at 1161. 
 38  Connally, 330 F. Supp. at 1164. 
 39  Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230. 
 40  Id. 
 41  Id. 
 42  Id.  See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 27 cmt. a (2003) (“[Charitable] 
trust purposes and provisions must not be unlawful or contrary to public policy . . . .”). 
 43  Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.  
 44  Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 735 (1974). 
 45  Id. at 734–35.  The university forbade interracial dating, based on its 
interpretation of the Bible, but believed that the only way to enforce such a prohibition 
was by refusing to admit African American students.  Id. at 735. 
 46  Id.  
 47  Id. 
 48  Id. at 749. 
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University’s section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status, effective as of 
December 1, 1970.49 
Bob Jones University ultimately appealed the revocation to the 
Supreme Court, where it argued that the plain language of section 
501(c)(3)—which specifically includes educational purposes among 
purposes entitled to tax exemption—guaranteed them tax-exempt 
status.50  The Code, it pointed out, included no express requirement 
that all exempt organizations meet the common law definition of 
charitable.51  In fact, the list of acceptable exempt purposes in section 
501(c)(3) was disjunctive, belying the requirement that all exempt 
entities had to qualify as charitable.52  Rather, the University argued, 
under section 501(c)(3), an organization that fell within any of the 
categories listed automatically qualified as tax-exempt.53 
The Supreme Court disagreed that the categories were 
disjunctive.  Rather, it determined that “Congress sought to provide 
tax benefits to charitable organizations, to encourage the development 
of private institutions that serve a useful public purpose or supplement 
or take the place of public institutions of the same kind.”54  As a 
corollary to this public benefit requirement, the Supreme Court 
agreed with the I.R.S. that violations of public policy were inconsistent 
with tax exemption.55  The Supreme Court held that determining what 
constituted a violation of public policy fell within the I.R.S.’s 
authority.56  Ultimately, then, an organization that violates a clear 
public policy does not qualify as tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3).57 
B. The Reach of the Public Policy Doctrine 
Although the Supreme Court only adopted the public policy rule 
with respect to entities seeking exemption under section 501(c)(3),58 
we must nonetheless explore whether, as a normative matter, the 
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (or any 
religious or apostolic organization that violates public policy) should 
 
 49  Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 581 (1983). 
 50  Id. at 585. 
 51  Id. 
 52  Id.  See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2015) (to qualify for exemption, organizations must 
be “organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for 
public safety, literary, or educational purposes . . . .”).  
 53  Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 585–86. 
 54  Id. at 588.  
 55  Id. at 591. 
 56  Id. at 596. 
 57  See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B. 158. 
 58  See supra Part II.A. 
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receive tax benefits.  That is, section 501(d) reduces the collective 
amount of taxes paid by religious and apostolic organizations and their 
members by implementing a single level of taxation.  If those 
organizations’ actions or teachings violate public policy, perhaps the 
tax law should import the public policy doctrine to prevent the 
violation. 
At one time, courts applied the public policy doctrine not only to 
entities exempt from taxation under section 501(c)(3), but, in limited 
circumstances, to for-profit businesses.59  The tax law generally permits 
businesses to deduct “all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or 
incurred . . . in carrying on any trade or business.”60  In the 1950s, 
though, the Supreme Court held that an expense did not qualify as 
necessary “if allowance of the deduction would frustrate sharply defined 
national or state policies proscribing particular types of conduct, 
evidenced by some governmental declaration thereof.”61 
Congress partially codified this denial of deductions that violate 
public policy by disallowing deductions for certain bribes, kickbacks, 
other illegal payments, and for fines and other penalties incurred for 
breaking the law.62  As part of its codification, however, Congress 
superseded and limited the judicially-promulgated public policy rule.63  
Only those deductions Congress explicitly laid out in the Code were to 
be denied as violating public policy.64 
Today, then, taxpayers involved in illegal businesses must report 
and pay taxes on their illegal income.65  In calculating their taxable 
income, however, courts consistently permit illegal businesses to 
deduct typical business expenses.66  For example, courts have allowed 
bookies to deduct rents and salaries paid.67  They have permitted the 
 
 59  JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 91ST CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX 
REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 233 (Comm. Print 1970) (under prior law, “a number of 
business expenses were disallowed on the ground that the allowance of these 
deductions would be contrary to Federal or State ‘public policy’”). 
 60  I.R.C. § 162(a) (2012). 
 61  Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Comm’r, 356 U.S. 30, 33–34 (1958). 
 62  See I.R.C. § 162(c) (2012); Edward J. Roche, Jr., Federal Income Taxation of Medical 
Marijuana Businesses, 66 TAX LAW. 429, 435–36 (2013). 
 63  S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 2311 (1969) (Conf. Rep.) (“Public policy . . . generally is 
not sufficiently clearly defined to justify the disallowance of deductions.”).  
 64  Id. (“The provision for the denial of the deduction for payments in these 
situations which are deemed to violate public policy is intended to be all inclusive.”). 
 65  United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263 (1927) (“We see no . . . reason why 
the fact that a business is unlawful should exempt it from paying the taxes that if lawful 
it would have to pay.”). 
 66  Roche, supra note 62, at 433. 
 67  English v. Comm’r, 249 F.2d 432, 433 (7th Cir. 1957). 
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proprietors of a massage and prostitution business to deduct ordinary 
business expenses (including, inter alia, office furnishings, telephones, 
and advertising).68  In fact, the I.R.S. has held that an arms dealer, 
making illegal sales to foreign governments, could deduct the cost of 
payments it made to procure arms contracts.69 
Ultimately, outside of the section 501(c)(3) exemption, the tax 
law is largely agnostic as to the legality and appropriateness of 
taxpayers’ actions.  Instead, 
the federal income tax is a tax on net income, not a sanction 
against wrongdoing.  That principle has been firmly imbedded 
in the tax statute from the beginning.  One familiar facet of the 
principle is the truism that the statute does not concern itself 
with the lawfulness of the income that it taxes.  Income from a 
criminal enterprise is taxed at a rate no higher and no lower 
than income from more conventional sources.70 
Clearly, if a religious or apostolic organization violates public 
policy, the government should act to stop that violation, and perhaps 
should censure the organization.  Such prevention and censure, 
however, should occur outside of the tax law.  The tax law, without 
explicit Congressional action, generally—and rightly—does not 
concern itself with the appropriateness of a taxpayer’s action, but 
rather with raising the appropriate revenue as a result of that action. 
C. Public Policy and Other Exempt Organizations 
The I.R.S. has taken the position that social welfare groups, 
exempt from taxation under section 501(c)(4), also cannot engage in 
illegal conduct.71  In a revenue ruling, the I.R.S. determined that an 
antiwar organization that organized protests and encouraged 
nonviolent civil disobedience did not qualify for exemption either as a 
public charity under section 501(c)(3) or as a social welfare 
organization under section 501(c)(4).72  In its section 501(c)(3) 
analysis, the I.R.S. mentioned that, because section 501(c)(3)’s 
definition of “charitable” derived from the law of charitable trusts, an 
applicant for exempt status under section 501(c)(3) could not act 
illegally or in violation of public policy.73 
 
 68  Toner v. Comm’r, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 1016, 1021 (1990), aff’d, 958 F.2d 362 (3d 
Cir. 1992).  
 69  I.R.S. Field Serv. Advisory 2001-28-004 (Jul. 13, 2001). 
 70  Comm’r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691 (1966).  
 71  Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204.  
 72  Id. 
 73  Id. 
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Notably, the analysis of section 501(c)(4) in the same revenue 
ruling made no mention of the public policy requirement.74  Instead, 
the I.R.S. found that the antiwar group did not qualify under section 
501(c)(4) because “[i]llegal activities . . . are contrary to the common 
good and the general welfare of the people in a community and thus 
are not permissible means of promoting the social welfare for purposes 
of section 501(c)(4) of the Code.”75  Apparently, the I.R.S. did not 
believe that the broad public policy requirement applied to tax 
exemptions outside of section 501(c)(3).  In explaining its holding, 
the I.R.S. does not argue that any organization that acts illegally cannot 
qualify for a tax exemption.  Rather, it argues that illegal activities do 
not bring about “social betterments and social improvements,” the sine 
qua non of social welfare groups qualifying under section 501(c)(4).76 
Professor Benjamin Leff has argued persuasively that the public 
policy’s derivation from the common law of charities means that its 
application must be limited to entities seeking exemption under 
section 501(c)(3) of the Code.77  Professor Leff also argues that, as a 
normative matter, the I.R.S. should permit entities that meet the other 
requirements to qualify as exempt social welfare organizations under 
section 501(c)(4).78 
Professor Leff acknowledges the controversial nature of his 
argument that the I.R.S. should permit at least some entities that 
violate federal law to qualify as exempt under section 501(c)(4).79  In 
fact, Professor Philip Hackney has responded to Professor Leff, 
arguing that the public policy requirement should apply more broadly 
than merely to organizations exempt under section 501(c)(3).80  
Though Professor Hackney acknowledges that, as a general rule, the 
tax law does not police illegality, he argues that tax exemptions are 
 
 74  Id. 
 75  Id. 
 76  Id. 
 77  See Benjamin Moses Leff, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 IOWA L. REV. 
523, 536 (2014). 
 78  Id. at 537 (“Therefore, I am arguing that the I.R.S. should recognize the tax-
exempt status under § 501(c)(4) of a social welfare organization whose primary activity 
is illegal—even criminal—under federal law.”).  
 79  Id. (“I understand that such an argument is controversial . . . .”). 
 80  Philip T. Hackney, A Response to Professor Leff’s Tax Planning “Olive Branch” for 
Marijuana Dealers, 99 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 25, 26 (2014) (“I contend that the public 
policy doctrine should apply with equal force to social welfare organizations and 
charitable organizations, as these organizations are merely kissing cousins without 
significant structural differences.”) (footnote omitted).  
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different.81  A tax exemption, he argues, is primarily a subsidy.82  
Because the government (and, by extension, taxpayers) subsidize tax-
exempt organizations, it makes sense to broadly prohibit them from 
violating the law or public policy. 
Even if Professor Hackney is correct about the scope of the public 
policy doctrine, though, his reasoning does not extend to entities 
exempt under section 501(d).  As I have demonstrated in this Article, 
the exemption under section 501(d) does not function as a subsidy.83  
Instead, the tax exemption for religious and apostolic organizations 
attempts to accurately reflect the economics of communitarian 
organizations.84  This is precisely what Professor Hackney argues, 
correctly, that most tax exemptions do not attempt.  Thus, even if 
Professor Hackney is correct that the public policy doctrine should 
find itself rooted in tax exemption rather than the common law of 
charitable trusts, its reach should end at section 501(d).  As long as the 
I.R.S. does not demand that other pass-through entities—including 
partnerships, S corporations, and regulated investment companies—
meet the public policy requirement, it should not hold communitarian 
organizations to such a requirement. 
D. Public Policy and Religious or Apostolic Communitarian Groups 
The I.R.S. has no legal or policy basis for requiring applicants for 
exemption under section 501(d) to meet the public policy 
requirement.  Nonetheless, it has demonstrated that it broadly reads 
that requirement into section 501(d).  In a private letter ruling issued 
in 2013, the I.R.S. disallowed a polygamous group’s exemption under 
501(d).85  Although the I.R.S. redacts identifying information from 
private letter rulings,86 it, perhaps unintentionally, left information 
that indicates that the polygamous group in question was the 
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (“FLDS 
Church”).87 
 
 81  Id. at 31. 
 82  Id. 
 83  See infra notes 213–219 and accompanying text. 
 84  See infra notes 236–242 and accompanying text. 
 85  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-100-47 (Dec. 11, 2012). 
 86  I.R.C. § 6110(c)(1) (2012). 
 87  Specifically, the private letter ruling refers to a “news article from 
Examiner.com . . . report[ing] that a court in your state found a leader [of your 
church] with three wives under ‘celestial marriages’ guilty of bigamy.”  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. 
Rul. 2013-100-47 (Dec. 11, 2012).  Similarly, Texas Monthly reported that FLDS leader 
Wendell Nielsen was convicted of bigamy for celestial marriage with three women.  
Katy Vine, FLDS Leader Convicted in Historic Bigamy Case, TEXAS MONTHLY (Jan. 21, 
2013), https://perma.cc/6886-UJU5.  Arguably, leaving that information in the letter 
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Although the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (“LDS 
Church”) discontinued its practice of polygamy in 1890,88 some 
members continued to believe that polygamy was a necessary and 
divinely sanctioned practice.89  The LDS Church continued to 
condemn polygamy and its sympathizers into the 1920s and early 
1930s, forcing those polygamists and sympathizers to leave the LDS 
church and establish the predecessor to the FLDS Church.90 
Though its practice of polygamy distinguishes the FLDS Church 
in mainstream consciousness, its marital practices represent only one 
way it differs from its surrounding culture.91  Notably, as with other 
groups discussed in this Article, members of the FLDS Church engage 
in a type of communal economic life.92 
Several times in the nineteenth century, the LDS Church 
experimented with communalism.  Between 1831 and 1833, Joseph 
Smith, the founder of the LDS Church, implemented a communal 
economic order in which members “consecrated” their property by 
deeding it to a representative of the church.93  The representative then 
returned the property “as a life lease, together with land and materials 
 
ruling fails to meet the privacy requirements of the Treasury regulations.  See Treas. 
Reg. § 301.6110-3(a)(1)(ii) (1977) (requiring the deletion of “[a]ny other information 
that would permit a person generally knowledgeable with respect to the appropriate 
community to identify any person”). 
 88  See Bennion, supra note 4, at 102.  While the LDS Church originally 
discontinued the practice of polygamy in 1890, members “grappled with what the 
Woodruff Manifesto [which ended polygamy] meant.”  John Bennion, Mary Bennion 
Powell: Polygamy and Silence, 24 J. MORMON HIST. 85, 87–88 (1998).  Members of the LDS 
Church debated whether those in polygamous marriages were to separate, whether it 
merely meant that no new polygamous marriages would be solemnized, or whether it 
meant that members could continue to enter into polygamous marriages as long as 
they did so outside of the United States.  Id. at 88.  In 1904, the LDS Church released 
a second, unambiguous statement clearly renouncing polygamy.  Id. at 87.  
 89  Ken Driggs, After the Manifesto: Modern Polygamy and Fundamentalist Mormons, 32 
J. CHURCH & ST. 367, 375 (1990) (“But significant numbers of Mormons never 
accepted the demise of [polygamy].”).  
 90  Id. at 377 (describing that in 1933 “the last tolerance for diehards ended and 
an almost open war erupted between the [LDS] Church and the smaller body that 
came to call itself the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints”) 
(footnote omitted).  
 91  Eric G. Andersen, Protecting Religious Liberty Through the Establishment Clause: The 
Case of the United Effort Plan Trust Litigation, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 739, 741 (“The Church 
has made headlines over the years because of its practice of polygamy . . . .”).  
 92  See, e.g., id. (“An element of the Church’s communal life . . . is an economic 
arrangement that came to be called the ‘United Effort Plan’ (UEP).  It involves the 
common ownership of assets, especially real property . . . .”); Bennion, supra note 4, at 
102 (“The movement relied on early Brigham Young doctrines of communalism and 
plural marriage . . . .”).  
 93  Dean L. May, One Heart and Mind: Communal Life and Values Among the Mormons, 
in AMERICA’S COMMUNAL UTOPIAS 135, 140–41 (Donald E. Pitzer ed., 1997).  
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sufficient to make a living at his chosen profession.”94  Although the 
LDS church never reintroduced this communalism during Smith’s 
lifetime,95 his successor Brigham Young tried to implement various 
versions of communalism in the 1850s and 1870s.96 
The FLDS Church inherited this communal impulse.  Established 
in a remote and isolated area on the Utah-Arizona border, adherents 
would move to the area, purchase land, and deed it to the FLDS 
Church.97  Though the legal forms of its earliest communal efforts have 
been lost,98 in 1942, the FLDS Church formed the United Effort Plan 
Trust (“UEP Trust”), which owned the consecrated property.99 
As with the LDS Church’s nineteenth-century experiments with 
communalism, although members of the FLDS Church deeded their 
land to the UEP Trust, they still had access to UEP Trust property.  The 
Trust assigned lots of land to members and encouraged them to build 
and improve homes on those lots.100  In addition, the UEP Trust gave 
plots of land to individuals for farming, operated several commercial 
enterprises that employed members of the FLDS Church, and 
provided services to members.101 
In its ruling, the I.R.S. acknowledges that the FLDS Church meets 
the textual requirements of section 501(d).  The FLDS Church meets 
the implicit requirement that it have a religious or apostolic 
character.102  In addition, it meets both explicit requirements: that it 
maintains a common treasury, and that its trust documents require 
members to include their pro rata share of the FLDS Church’s taxable 
income in gross income.103 
In spite of the FLDS Church’s compliance with section 501(d), 
 
 94  Id. at 141. 
 95  Id. at 142. 
 96  Id. at 146–48. 
 97  Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1239 (Utah 1998).  
 98  Andersen, supra note 91, at 744 (“The legal status of the group’s earliest 
communitarian economic arrangements is unclear.”).  
 99  Id. at 744. 
 100  Jeffs, 970 P.2d at 1239.  
 101  Id. at 1240 (“In 1986, Jeffs declared that all those living on UEP land were 
tenants at will.”); IRWIN ALTMAN & JOSEPH GINAT, POLYGAMOUS FAMILIES IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 63 (1996).  Altman and Ginat actually do not name the 
polygamous group they describe, calling it, instead, the United Fundamentalist 
Church.  Id. at 62.  Certain descriptions of the pseudonymous United Fundamentalist 
Church—especially the fact that it considers those who live on its land to be tenants at 
will—match the descriptions of the FLDS Church.  See id. at 63 (explaining that 
members who build on church land are tenants at will). 
 102  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-100-47 (Dec. 11, 2012).  
 103  Id. 
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though, the I.R.S. rejected its application for exemption under section 
501(d), using essentially identical reasoning as it used to reject 
Principle Voices of Polygamy’s application for exemption under 
section 501(c)(3).104  The I.R.S. adopted the public policy analysis 
wholesale. 
The I.R.S. appears to recognize that the public policy 
requirement does not inherently map onto the requirements of 
section 501(d).  It asserts, however, that although section 501(d) “does 
not require explicit proof of charitable purposes, as does section 
501(c), courts have found an implicit requirement.”105  It cites 
Kleinsasser ex rel. Kleinsasser v. United States106 to support its assertion of 
an implicit charitable requirement.  Unfortunately, Kleinsasser makes 
no such finding.  In fact, the court in Kleinsasser contrasts the need for 
a charitable function under section 501(c)(3) with section 501(d)’s 
focus on form.107 
Requiring section 501(d) organizations to meet the public policy 
requirement finds no support in the Code, the case law or any other 
tax policy consideration.  Congress has broadly rejected the 
application of public policy to the tax law, except in the narrow area of 
charitable organizations.108  Partnerships, for example, do not lose 
their pass-through status solely because they violate public policy (or, 
for that matter, violate the law).  Although not identical, the 
exemption under section 501(d) resembles partnership pass-through 
treatment more than it does a charitable exemption from taxation.109 
 
 104  See infra notes 304–306 and accompanying text. 
 105  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-100-47 (Dec. 11, 2012). 
 106  Kleinsasser ex rel. Kleinsasser v. United States, 707 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 107  Id. at 1029 (“Nothing about the doctrine of ‘unrelated trade or business’ has 
any relevance to a § 501(d) organization because this organization is granted its 
exemption not because of function, but because of form.”).  The I.R.S. also cites two 
revenue rulings for the proposition that an organization seeking exemption under 
section 501(d) needs to “serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established 
public policy.”  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-100-47 (Dec. 11, 2012).  Neither revenue 
ruling applies to religious or apostolic organizations, though, and they provide no 
support for the assertion that section 501(d) has an implicit public policy requirement.  
Rather, one revenue ruling applies the public policy requirement to private schools 
with racially-discriminatory policies.  Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.  The other deals 
with antiwar protest groups seeking exemption under section 501(c)(3) or section 
501(c)(4).  Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204. 
 108  See supra Part II.C. 
 109  See Kleinsasser ex el. Kleinsasser v. United States, 707 F.2d 1024, 1026 (9th Cir. 
1983) (“The liability for members of § 501(d) organizations is determined through 
application of partnership accounting principles.”); Riker v. Comm’r, 244 F.2d 220, 
230 (9th Cir. 1957) (“One might assume, then, that Congress intended an association 
somewhat akin to the ordinary association or partnership in which each member has 
a definite, though undivided, interest in the business conducted for the common 
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Whether or not it expands the availability of the religious and 
apostolic exemption, then, Congress should rein in the I.R.S. as it 
responds to applications for exemption under section 501(d).  The 
courts have not compelled the I.R.S. to add any requirements for 
exemption under section 501(d) to those listed in the Code.  The 
underlying justification for the public policy requirement applies 
solely to tax-exempt organizations that, unlike communitarian 
organizations, find their tax exemption rooted in the law of public 
charities.110  By imposing requirements beyond those found in the 
Code, the I.R.S. adds uncertainty to the administration of the tax law 
and raises the cost of exemption.  The additional uncertainty and cost, 
in turn, may discourage otherwise-qualifying organizations from 
electing a tax regime that best reflects their pre-tax economics. 
 
III. COMMUNITARIANISM IN THE UNITED STATES 
Communal property ownership has deep roots in the United 
States.  Even before European colonization of the Americas, most 
Native American nations’ land ownership regimes had strong 
communal underpinnings.111  Almost from the moment European 
settlers arrived in the Americas, they established communitarian living 
situations brought from their native countries.112  Early communal 
groups in the American colonies found their basis in European 
religious dissent.113  In the face of persecution, these religious 
dissenters joined the early waves of migrations to North America.114  
Their reading of the Bible convinced them that, as a body of believers, 
they needed to “practice[] common ownership of property, common 
 
benefit of the members, as well as a common interest in the community treasury and 
property.”); see also infra notes 236, 242 and accompanying text.  
 110  None of this means to suggest that society should allow communitarian 
organizations to violate the law and fundamental public policy as they wish.  If, 
however, society regards polygamy as violating public policy, it should be regulated 
directly.  The purpose of section 501(d) is to provide a taxation scheme that reflects 
the economics of communitarian organizations, irrespective of whether society likes 
what they do.  See supra Part II.B.  There is no reason to revive and impose a vestigial 
public policy requirement on one specific business form. 
 111  Julian C. Juergensmeyer & James B. Wadley, The Common Lands Concept: A 
“Commons” Solution to a Common Environmental Problem, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 361, 371–
72 (1974) (“[N]early all [Native American tribes] contained a strong element of 
communal ownership, the progenitor of the common lands concept.”). 
 112  Donald F. Durnbaugh, Communitarian Societies in Colonial America, in AMERICA’S 
COMMUNAL UTOPIAS 14, 15 (Donald E. Pitzer ed., 1997). 
 113  Id. 
 114  Id. 
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production of goods, and common use of all things.”115 
The early nineteenth century saw a flourishing of communal 
groups, including such prominent groups as the Shakers, the Harmony 
Society, and the Oneida Community.116  By the twentieth century, 
communal religious groups had become 
less prominent, less publicly visible, than their illustrious 
predecessors had been.  No communal situation in the 
twentieth century . . . was as flamboyant as that of the hundreds 
of Oneidans living in complex marriage or the thousands of 
Shakers living celibately in a score of tidy, quaint villages had 
been.117 
Even with their lowered profiles, however, dozens of Christian 
communal groups, including the Hutterites and the Shakers, 
continued into the twentieth century.118  And the early twentieth 
century saw the birth of additional religious communitarian groups, 
though these groups often became known for attributes other than 
their communitarianism.  For example, in 1903, Benjamin Purnell 
founded the Israelite House of David.119  The Israelite House of David 
came to be known as much for its Eden Springs Amusement Park, its 
baseball teams, and its bands, as for its communitarian religious 
ethos.120  The twentieth century also saw the formation of the FLDS 
church.121  In the 1920s, a group of Mormon dissenters organized a new 
movement that “relied on early Brigham Young doctrines of 
communalism and plural marriage.”122 
Not all early-twentieth-century religious communitarian groups 
were Christian, however.  The late nineteenth and early twentieth 
 
 115  Id. at 14.  Christian utopians found the basis for their communitarianism in the 
early Apostolic church, where “[a]ll who believed were together and had all things in 
common; they would sell their possessions and goods and distribute the proceeds to 
all, as any had need.”  Acts 2:44–45.  Their sense of community caused, “the whole 
group of those who believed [to be] of one heart and soul, and no one claimed private 
ownership of any possessions, but everything they owned was held in common.”  Acts 
4:32.  These utopian religious dissenters intended to reproduce the economics of the 
Apostolic church.  See Karl J.R. Arndt, George Rapp’s Harmony Society, in AMERICA’S 
COMMUNAL UTOPIAS 57, 60 (Donald E. Pitzer ed., 1997) (“Rapp, like the leaders of the 
Moravians, Seventh Day Baptists, and Shakers, was influenced by the description of 
first-century Christian communal practices in Acts 2 and 4.”).  
 116  MILLER, QUEST FOR UTOPIA, supra note 9, at xi.  
 117  Id. at xvii. 
 118  Id. at 1. 
 119  CLARE E. ADKIN, BROTHER BENJAMIN: A HISTORY OF THE ISRAELITE HOUSE OF DAVID 
2 (1990).  
 120  MILLER, QUEST FOR UTOPIA, supra note 9, at 81. 
 121  Bennion, supra note 4, at 103–04. 
 122  Id. at 102. 
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centuries, for example, saw the formation of a number of new African 
American religions known as “black Judaism.”123  Two of these 
groups—the Church of God and Saints of Christ and the Temple of 
the Gospel of the Kingdom—involved communal living.124  The 
Vendanta Society, part of the Ramakrishna movement, also established 
a number of communal colonies in the United States in the early 
twentieth century.125 
As the twentieth century continued, communal groups continued 
to multiply and their ideological foundations diversified.  Not only did 
communalism expand beyond Christians trying to reproduce first-
century Christian economics, it also expanded beyond merely religious 
communities.  The 1930s “saw hundreds of new communities emerge, 
many of them the fruit of government depression-fighting 
programs.”126  Various “socialists, anarchists, cranks, visionaries, and 
other idealists” continued creating and running communitarian 
groups.127  Communal groups began a shift toward “less rigid governing 
structures and lifestyle regulations.”128  As they became less rigid about 
governance and lifestyle, they also became less rigid about property 
ownership, allowing their members a mix of communal and personal 
forms of ownership.129 
After a lull in communitarian communities during World War II, 
the late 1940s and 1950s saw a resurgence in communal experiments.130  
Intentional communities pushed back against the post-war 
urbanization of America.131  Many of these 1950s intentional 
communities were loosely affiliated under the auspices of the 
Fellowship of Intentional Communities.132  Economically, these groups 
“ranged from fully communal, with members living from a common 
purse, to land-trust situations in which family finances were largely 
private”; religiously and philosophically, they included groups as 
diverse as Quaker, Protestants, and secular individuals.133 
 
 123  MILLER, QUEST FOR UTOPIA, supra note 9, at 84–85. 
 124  Id. at 85–86.  In spite of its name, the Church of God and Saints of Christ, 
“[t]itular nomenclature notwithstanding . . . had substantial Jewish content from the 
first.”  Id. 
 125  Id. at 91–93. 
 126  Id. at 121. 
 127  Id. 
 128  Id. at 156. 
 129  MILLER, QUEST FOR UTOPIA, supra note 9, at 156. 
 130  Id. at 162. 
 131  Id. at 163. 
 132  Id. at 163–64. 
 133  Id. at 164. 
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The 1960s marked a new resurgence in communalism.134  In 1965, 
with the founding of Colorado’s Drop City, “the new genre of the 
hippie commune became fully formed.”135  Rather than pursuing a 
common religious or philosophical path, Drop City brought together 
many of the mid-twentieth-century communitarian themes: “anarchy, 
pacifism, sexual freedom, rural isolation, interest in drugs, [and] 
art.”136  The Drop City economy, though poor, was truly communal, 
with new residents contributing their money (if they had any) to a 
common fund, and with residents sharing all other property, too.137 
After Drop City, hippie communes began to spread, especially in 
California, northern New Mexico, and on the East Coast from Virginia 
north through New England.138  The ascendance of hippie communes 
did not, of course, mark the end of earlier communal groups,139 though 
hippies may have been largely unaware of their communitarian 
forebears.140 
Even today, new forms of communitarian living continue to 
emerge.  For example, as baby boomers start to reach retirement age, 
many search for a different kind of retirement from their parents.141  
Rather than ending up in a traditional nursing home, or trying to 
maintain their independence alone in their own homes, an increasing 
number opt to live in intentional communities.142  These communities 
engage in communal living to one degree or another—at the very least, 
the residents eat and act together, and often put money into a 
common fund to pay for their expenses.143 
Communitarians today tend to be less isolationist than previous 
 
 134  TIMOTHY MILLER, THE 60S COMMUNES: HIPPIES AND BEYOND 17 (1999) 
[hereinafter MILLER, THE 60S COMMUNES].  
 135  Id. 
 136  Id. at 31. 
 137  Id. at 35. 
 138  Id. at 41. 
 139  Id. at 8 (“It is also important to realize that earlier American communitarianism 
had not ground to a halt when the new generation of communes appeared so visibly 
on the scene.”). 
 140  MILLER, THE 60S COMMUNES, supra note 134, at 1 (“[M]any hippies . . . were not 
consciously interested in history, seeing themselves as new people creating a whole 
new social order independent of the past.”). 
 141  See, e.g., Elaine Louie, Till Death (or Decorating Disputes) Do Us Part, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sep. 19, 2013, at D1 (“[Cheesecake] was one of a number of such experiments, known 
as cohousing communities, that were springing up around the country at the time, 
based on a Danish model developed in the 1960s.”); Elaine Louie, Retirement? For 11 
Friends It’s Off to Camp, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1994, at C1 (communally-owned retirement 
location).  
 142  Louie, Till Death (or Decorating Disputes) Do Us Part, supra note 141, at D1. 
 143  Id. 
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generations.144  This more accommodating posture allows a wide range 
of purposes and goals.  Beyond religious and countercultural 
communes, communal structures potentially provide a utopia for 
retirees and others who have needs or desires that standard capitalist 
society does not meet. 
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 501(D) 
A. Communitarian Religious Groups v. the Income Tax 
During the first decade of the modern federal income tax, the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue—predecessor to the I.R.S.—asserted tax 
deficiencies against several communitarian religious groups.  The 
Israelite House of David and two Hutterite groups proceeded to sue 
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, asserting they were exempt from 
taxation.  Ultimately, all three groups lost, with the courts uniformly 
holding that they failed to qualify as exempt from taxation. 
The district court’s decision in Israelite House of David v. Holden145 
ultimately provides no insight into why the Bureau determined that 
the Israelite House of David did not qualify for a tax exemption.  
Believing that it qualified for an exemption from taxes, the Israelite 
House of David sued to enjoin the Bureau from imposing or collecting 
taxes from it, as well as for a refund of taxes, interest, and penalties it 
had paid.146  Rather than addressing the substance of the Israelite 
House of David’s claims, though, the court dismissed the case on 
jurisdictional grounds.147  The court held that the Tax Anti-Injunction 
Act prevented it from hearing any “suit for the purpose of restraining 
the assessment or collection of any tax.”148  It also held that, as a court 
of equity, it could not hear the portion of the Israelite House of David’s 
suit demanding a refund of taxes, interest, and penalties paid.149  The 
court thus dismissed the suit without addressing the merits. 
In two cases concerning the Hutterites, on the other hand, the 
courts did discuss the merits of the Bureau of Internal Revenue 
 
 144  JOSEPH C. MANZELLA, COMMON PURSE, UNCOMMON FUTURE 170 (2010) (“Today’s 
communitarians tend to avoid the pitfalls of choosing between hypermodernity and 
their community by not so much rejecting the outside world as rejecting the more 
egregious parts of it, such as excessive materialism and waste, while incorporating 
those aspects that are helpful.”). 
 145  Israelite House of David v. Holden, 14 F.2d 701 (W.D. Mich. 1926).  
 146  Id. at 702. 
 147  Id. at 703. 
 148  See 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2012) (current codification of the Tax Anti-Injunction 
Act); Israelite House of David, 14 F.2d at 702–03. 
 149  Israelite House of David, 14 F.2d at 702. 
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position, holding that Hutterite corporations did not qualify for tax 
exemption.  Those cases provide insight into why the Bureau—and 
ultimately the courts—were uncomfortable with permitting 
communitarian religious groups to claim an exemption from tax. 
The Hutterites, a branch of the Anabaptists, trace their origins to 
1528, and began migrating from the Ukraine to the United States in 
the 1870s.150  Initially, the Hutterites established three colonies in 
South Dakota; today, the religion has grown to more than 350 colonies 
throughout North America.151  A communitarian group, the Hutterites 
eschew personal property, following the early Christian church in 
holding property communally.152  Effectively, this means that all 
property in a Hutterite colony belongs to the church, not to the 
individual believers.153  The church then allocates a monthly allowance, 
furniture, food, clothing, and other necessities, to individuals in 
accordance with their need.154  Individuals have the right to use these 
goods, but do not actually own them.155  Ultimately, while individual 
Hutterites may not have any significant personal property, the church’s 
allocation functions as a “cradle-to-the-grave social security system.”156 
In 1897, the Hutterites formed Hutterische Gemeinde Elmspring, 
a South Dakota corporation.157  In 1917 (the year at issue in the case), 
Hutterische Gemeinde Elmspring consisted of four colonies and 
engaged in various agricultural pursuits, including raising wheat, rye, 
oats, corn, cattle, hogs, horses, sheep, and poultry.158  It owned 
farmland, farm implements, flour mills, “blacksmith shops, broom 
works, harness and shoe shops, and a bakery.”159  It earned net income 
of $145,969.50 in 1917, which it used to support its members, maintain 
its property, and to purchase additional property.160  Hutterische 
 
 150  MILLER, QUEST FOR UTOPIA, supra note 9, at 7. 
 151  Id. 
 152  Alvin Esau, Communal Property and Freedom of Religion: Lakeside Colony of Hutterian 
Brethren v. Hofer, in RELIGIOUS CONSCIENCE, THE STATE, AND THE LAW: HISTORICAL 
CONTEXTS AND CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE 97, 101 (John McLaren & Harold Coward 
eds., 1999).  
 153  Id. at 100–01. 
 154  Hanna Kienzler, Communal Longevity: The Hutterite Case, 100 ANTHROPOS 193, 
202 (2005). 
 155  Id.  Individuals do, however, own goods they purchase with their monthly 
allowance.  Id. 
 156  Pierre L. van den Berghe & Karl Peter, Hutterites and Kibbutzniks: A Tale of 
Nepotistic Communism, 23 MAN 522, 532 (1988) [hereinafter van den Berghe & Peter].  
 157  Hofer v. United States, 64 Ct. Cl. 672, 682 (1928).  
 158  Id. at 673. 
 159  Id. 
 160  Id. 
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Gemeinde Elmspring claimed exemption under the Revenue Act of 
1916 as a “[c]orporation . . . organized and operated exclusively for 
religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes, no part of the 
net income of which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder 
or individual.”161 
The court found two significant deficiencies in Hutterische 
Gemeinde Elmspring’s claim that it met the exemption requirements.  
First, the corporation clearly violated the no-private-inurement 
requirement.  In fact, it used a significant portion of its profits 
specifically for the support and maintenance of its members.162  
Second, given its extensive business activities, it failed the “operated 
exclusively for religious purposes” test.163  As a result of its failure to 
meet these two requirements, the court held that Hutterische 
Gemeinde Elmspring did not qualify as a tax-exempt public charity, 
and thus owed taxes on its income.164 
The Board of Tax Appeals came to a similar conclusion regarding 
Hutterische Bruder Gemeinde.  The Hutterites incorporated 
Hutterische Bruder Gemeinde in South Dakota in 1905.165  Hutterische 
Bruder Gemeinde had no capital stock or shareholders; instead, its 
members were individuals who “subscribed to the religious beliefs and 
practices” of the Hutterites.166  Upon joining, members had to transfer 
their property to Hutterische Bruder Gemeinde, and, after 
transferring their property, subsequently began to work for the 
corporation.167  Among other things, the corporation produced 
agricultural products and owned and operated grist mills, a broom 
factory, a machine shop, a carpenter shop, and a ferryboat.168  It sold 
products that it produced to the public at market prices.169  In 
compensation for members’ work in its various endeavors, Hutterische 
Bruder Gemeinde provided them with necessities.170 
Like the claims court, the Board of Tax Appeals found that 
 
 161  Id. at 683.  This language is substantially similar to the current Code’s 
exemption for public charities.  See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2015) (“Corporations . . . 
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for 
public safety, literary, or educational purposes . . . no part of the net earnings of which 
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual . . . .”).  
 162  Id. at 684. 
 163  Hofer, 64 Ct. Cl. at 684. 
 164  Id. at 683. 
 165  Hutterische Bruder Gemeinde v. Comm’r, 1 B.T.A. 1208, 1208 (1925).  
 166  Id.  
 167  Id. at 1208–09. 
 168  Id. at 1209. 
 169  Id.  
 170  Id.  
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Hutterische Bruder Gemeinde failed to qualify as a charitable 
endeavor.  Its profits, the Board found, did not provide benefits to the 
general public.171  Rather, the profits went solely to support the 
corporation’s members.172  The Board also looked at the scope of 
Hutterische Bruder Gemeinde’s commercial activities—10,000 acres 
of farmland, producing far more than the members themselves 
needed—and the fact that it sold the surplus to the general public at 
the prevailing market rate.173  Its activities, the Board held, were carried 
on both for profit and in direct competition with other citizens.174  Even 
if Hutterische Bruder Gemeinde was originally formed for religious 
purposes, it failed to prove that it was operated exclusively for religious 
purpose.175  It therefore failed to qualify for an exemption from 
taxation. 
These communitarian religious organizations did not only face 
the corporate income tax, however.  Because their members could not 
hold property individually, the organizations could not distribute their 
income to members.  Instead, communitarian religious organizations 
would have to hold their profits in excess of the costs associated with 
their businesses and the costs of supporting their members.  But if they 
failed to distribute their income, they would have to pay an 
undistributed earnings tax on top of the corporate income tax they 
had already paid.176  It was against this backdrop that Congress passed 
its targeted exemption of communitarian religious and apostolic 
organizations. 
B. Tax-Exempt Organizations 
The best known exempt organizations are the public charities and 
private foundations exempt under section 501(c)(3).  These include, 
 
 171  Hutterische Bruder Gemeinde, 1 B.T.A. at 1211.  
 172  Id. 
 173  Id. 
 174  Id.  The fear of unfair competition between tax-exempt entities and taxable 
entities engaged in the same business led to Congress enacting the unrelated business 
income tax.  See Samuel D. Brunson, Repatriating Tax-Exempt Investments: Tax Havens, 
Blocker Corporations, and Unrelated Debt-Financed Income, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 225, 232 
(2012) [hereinafter Brunson, Tax Havens]. 
 175  Hutterische Bruder Gemeinde, 1 B.T.A. at 1212. 
 176  See Meade Emory & Lawrence Zelenak, The Tax Exempt Status of Communitarian 
Religious Organizations: An Unnecessary Controversy?, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1110 
(1982).  To the extent a corporation accumulated profit in excess of its reasonable 
needs, it became subject to the accumulated earnings tax in addition to the corporate 
income tax it paid when it earned its income.  See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Kwall, Subchapter G of 
the Internal Revenue Code: Crusade Without a Cause?, 5 VA. TAX REV. 223, 235 (1985); 
Homer L. Elliot, The Accumulated Earnings Tax and the Reasonable Needs of the Business: A 
Proposal, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 34, 35–36 (1970) [hereinafter Emory & Zelenak].  
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among other things, churches, universities, museums, some hospitals, 
and the NCAA.177  The tax law also exempts, among other types of 
organizations, social welfare organizations,178 non-profit credit 
unions,179 labor unions,180 and even the National Football League.181 
As a general rule, none of these organizations pays taxes on its 
income.182  The Code provides public charities and private foundations 
with one significant advantage over other tax-exempt entities, however: 
not only are they exempt from taxation,183 but donors to public 
charities can deduct from their taxable income the value of their 
donations to the charity.184  For example, in 2016, a married couple 
filing a joint return with taxable income of $100,000 pays $16,542.50 
of federal income tax.185  If the couple makes a deductible donation of 
$10,000 to a public charity, however, that reduces the couple’s tax 
liability by $2,500, and the government only receives $14,042.50.186  
And because the public charity has no tax liability, the government 
does not recoup the lost revenue.  Under this double benefit, then, 
public charities avoid paying taxes on their income,187 while the 
 
 177  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2015); see also Brigham Daniels, When Agencies Go Nuclear: A 
Game Theoretic Approach to the Biggest Sticks in an Agency’s Arsenal, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
442, 456 (2012) (“Tax-exempt organizations constitute some of society’s most revered 
and important institutions: churches, universities, hospitals . . . museums, and other 
organizations built to serve the needs of the poor, advance the arts, and educate 
society.”).  
 178  I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2015).  The recent Supreme Court case, Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission has probably made Citizens United the best-known of these 
exempt social welfare organizations.  See Nikki Usher & Michelle D. Layser, The Quest 
to Save Journalism: A Legal Analysis of New Models for Newspapers from Nonprofit Tax-Exempt 
Organizations to L3Cs, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 1315, 1356 (2010) (“Citizens United is a 
501(c)(4) social welfare organization . . . .”).  
 179  I.R.C. § 501(c)(14) (2015). 
 180  Id. § 501(c)(5). 
 181  Id. § 501(c)(6).  Congress explicitly enacted an exemption for the NFL in 1986, 
ostensibly as a way of ensuring its “pension and merger arrangement would not 
endanger its exemption.”  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-210-94 (Feb. 26, 1983).  The I.R.S. 
has read the specific provision broadly enough, however, to encompass other 
professional sports leagues.  Id. 
 182  I.R.C. § 501(a) (2015). 
 183  Id. § 501(c)(3). 
 184  Id. § 170(a). 
 185  Rev. Proc. 2015-53 § 2.01, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615.  The I.R.S. arrives at that number 
by subtracting $75,300 from $100,000, and multiplying the difference by 0.25.  It then 
adds the product and $10,367.50.  
 186  Id. 
 187  One exception exists to public charities’ exemption from taxation: under the 
unrelated business income tax, entities exempt under section 501(c)(3) nonetheless 
pay taxes on certain income they earn while engaged in for-profit business.  Id.; I.R.C. 
§ 511(a) (2012). 
BRUNSON (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/2016  12:05 PM 
2016] TAXING UTOPIA 163 
government collects less tax than it otherwise would from taxpayers 
who donate to public charities. 
This double benefit is not available, however, to most tax-exempt 
organizations.  With the exception of donors to public charities and a 
small handful of other tax-exempt organizations,188 donors to tax-
exempt organizations cannot deduct their donations.189 
C. Religious, Apostolic, and Exempt 
In 1936, Congress provided a special tax exemption specifically 
for communitarian religious organizations.190  The sparse legislative 
history does not reveal Congress’s motivation in enacting this 
exemption,191 but it seems fair to assume that the Israelite House of 
David and Hutterite cases motivated and influenced the legislation.  By 
the 1920s, the Israelite House of David—mentioned explicitly in the 
legislative history—had gained a national reputation.192  That national 
reputation may have provided the Israelite House of David the 
institutional clout to convince legislators that, in light of their losses at 
the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the courts, these communitarian 
religious groups needed the legislation.193 
The exemption provided to communitarian religious groups falls 
 
 188  In addition to public charities and private foundations exempt under section 
501(c)(3), the Internal Revenue Code permits deductions for certain donations made 
to states and their political subdivisions, war veteran organizations, fraternal 
organizations, and cemeteries.  I.R.C. § 170(c) (2012). 
 189  New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934) (“Whether and to 
what extent deductions shall be allowed depends upon legislative grace; and only as 
there is clear provision therefor can any particular deduction be allowed.”).  
 190  Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 101(18), 49 Stat. 1648, 1675–76; see also IRM 
7.25.23.2 (Feb. 23, 1999) (section 501(d) “dates back to the Revenue Act of 1936”). 
 191  The full legislative history of the provisions consists of a single paragraph in the 
Congressional Record: 
It has been brought to the attention of the committee that certain religious 
and apostolic associations and corporations, such as the House of David and 
the Shakers, have been taxed as corporations, and that since their rules 
prevent their members from being holders of property in an individual 
capacity the corporations would be subject to the undistributed-profits tax.  
These organizations have a small agricultural or other business.  The effect 
of the proposed amendment is to exempt these corporations from the 
normal corporation tax and the undistributed-profits tax, if their members 
take up their shares of the corporations’ income on their own individual 
returns.  It is believed that this provision will give them relief, and their 
members will be subject to a fair tax. 
80 CONG. REC. 9074 (1936) (statement of Sen. Walsh).  
 192  ADKIN, supra note 119, at 79.  
 193  Id. at 46 n.71 (“If the system of taxation hadn’t been changed [the Israelite 
House of David] would have gone out of business.”).  
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closer to the exemptions for non-charities than to the exemption for 
public charities.  To qualify for an exemption, section 501(d) requires 
that the communitarian religious group be organized as a corporation 
for tax purposes.194  If it meets the requirements of section 501(d), it 
does not owe taxes on its income.195  Like most other tax-exempt 
entities, however, donors cannot deduct their donations to exempt 
communitarian religious groups.196 
A communitarian religious organization that wants to be exempt 
from taxes faces some additional, if ill-defined, qualification 
requirements as well.  First, it must be a “religious or apostolic” 
organization.197  Next, it must have a communal or community treasury 
used for the benefit of its members.198  Finally, its members must 
include their share of the organization’s income in their gross income 
for tax purposes.199 
The only unambiguous exemption requirement is the 
requirement that the communitarian organization qualify as a 
corporation for tax purposes.  The rest of the qualification 
requirements remain undefined and ambiguous.  For example, 
although such an organization must “have a religious or apostolic 
character,”200 the Code does not define what it means by “religious or 
apostolic.”  The limited legislative history also fails to define the terms, 
but it lists, as examples of religious and apostolic organizations, the 
Shakers and the Israelite House of David.201  Even providing two 
examples of groups that presumptively qualify as “religious and 
apostolic” fails to provide a usable definition, though.  It does not 
explain which shared qualities of these groups are central to their 
religious or apostolic nature—and are thus necessary for qualification 
purposes—and which are superfluous.202  Even as it passed the 
 
 194  I.R.C. § 501(d) (2015).  Under the tax law, an association is a business entity 
that is neither disregarded nor treated as a partnership.  Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) 
(2006).  Ultimately, then, an association is a subset of a corporation.  Treas. Reg. § 
301.7701-2(b)(2) (2016). 
 195  I.R.C. § 501(a), (d) (2015). 
 196  Id. § 170(c) (2012) (definition of “charitable contribution” does not include 
contribution to religious and apostolic groups). 
 197  Id. § 501(d) (2015). 
 198  Id. 
 199  Id. 
 200  Kleinsasser ex rel. Kleinsasser v. United States, 707 F.2d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 
1983).  
 201  80 Cong. Rec. 9074 (1936) (statement of Sen. Walsh) (“[C]ertain religious and 
apostolic associations and corporations, such as the House of David and the Shakers, 
have been taxed as corporations . . . .”).  
 202  For example, both groups were Christian.  See MILLER, QUEST FOR UTOPIA, supra 
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legislation, Congress recognized the problematic nature of such an 
attempt as it considered the legislation.203 
The common or community treasury requirement provides an 
additional layer of uncertainty.204  As with the definition of “religious 
and apostolic,” Congress failed to define what qualified as a common 
or community treasury.205  The Tax Court has provided some gloss on 
the definition, holding that a common or community treasury means 
that “property of such organizations not be held by members 
individually but rather held in a ‘community capacity’ with all 
members having equal interests in the community property.”206  While 
the court’s holding does not provide specific definitional contours, it 
goes on to explain that such treasuries should be used for the 
“maintenance and support” of the organization’s members.207  The 
court also held that a common or community treasury does not 
preclude members from also owning property apart from the 
organization; members of a religious or apostolic group do not, for 
example, have to take a vow of poverty.208 
In enacting the exemption for religious and apostolic 
organizations, Congress expressly recognized that they would engage 
in business.  The Code states that a qualifying organization can be 
exempt from tax “even if such associations or corporations engage in 
 
note 9, at 80 (“Although the House of David was definitively shaped by Purnell himself, 
it did stand in a fairly well-established nonmainstream Christian tradition.”); Priscilla 
J. Brewer, The Shakers of Mother Ann Lee, in AMERICA’S COMMUNAL UTOPIAS 37, 41 
(Donald E. Pitzer ed., 1997) (“He was particularly impressed by the Shakers’ practical 
Christianity . . . .”).  Does “religious or apostolic” therefore limit the exemption to 
Christian communitarian groups?  Additionally, both the Israelite House of David and 
the Shakers preached celibacy.  ADKIN, supra note 119, at 34 (“The religious practice 
[of the Israelite House of David] that drew the most attention from the outside world 
was celibacy . . . .”); STEPHEN J. STEIN, THE SHAKER EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA 118 (1992) 
(“The [Shakers] condemned marriage, private property, the established churches, 
democracy, and individual freedom by advocating celibacy, common property, the 
superiority of their own society, the authority of the ministry, and submissive 
obedience.”).  Could “religious or apostolic”—a prerequisite for tax exemption under 
section 501(d)—possibly rest on members of the organization eschewing sex?  
 203  See Twin Oaks Community, Inc. v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1233, 1244 (1986) (“[W]e 
note that the term ‘religious or apostolic associations or corporations’ is itself not 
defined in the statute, although Senator La Follette pointed out to Senator Couzens 
the inherent definitional problems.”), acq., 1987-2 C.B. 1.  
 204  I.R.C. § 501(d) (2015). 
 205  Twin Oaks Community, Inc., 87 T.C. at 1247 (“[W]e find it difficult to view 
Senator Walsh’s comment as defining . . . the terms ‘common treasury’ or ‘community 
treasury.’”). 
 206  Id. at 1248.  
 207  Id. 
 208  Id. at 1249. 
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business for the common benefit of the members.”209  With this 
language, Congress effectively overrode the “several court decisions 
[that] had denied exempt status to religious communities that 
operated commercial businesses, primarily on the theory that the 
operation of the business constituted a substantial non-exempt 
purpose.”210  While today, with the unrelated business income tax, the 
tax law recognizes that even exempt organizations can sometimes 
engage in business ventures,211 the inclusion in section 501(d) of an 
explicit authorization to do so signals that section 501(d) operates 
differently from other exemptions.  That is, section 501(d) does not 
exempt religious and apostolic organizations from tax because society 
has decided that they are not the kind of organizations that pay taxes.  
Instead, religious and apostolic organizations are exempt from tax 
because an exemption better reflects the economics of these 
organizations.212 
Notwithstanding the Code’s exemption of religious and apostolic 
organizations from paying taxes, their income does not go entirely 
untaxed.  Rather, members must include their “pro rata shares” 
(however defined) of the organization’s income in their own gross 
income, whether or not the organization distributes its income.213  The 
Code treats such deemed or actual distributions as dividends received 
by the members.214  Members cannot treat their inclusions as qualified 
dividend income, eligible for preferential long-term capital gain rates, 
though.215  Instead, they pay taxes on their pro rata share of the 
religious or apostolic organization’s income at their ordinary marginal 
 
 209  I.R.C. § 501(d) (2015). 
 210  Emory & Zelenak, supra note 176, at 1109–10; see supra notes 162–175 and 
accompanying text. 
 211  Emory & Zelenak, supra note 176, at 1110 (“With the addition of [the unrelated 
business income tax], the Service recognized that operation of a trade or business is 
not a bar to exempt status if the organization ‘is not organized or operated for the 
primary purpose of carrying on an unrelated trade or business . . . .’”).  
 212  See infra notes 239–242 and accompanying text.  Secondarily, the special tax 
treatment recognizes that, while communitarian organizations operate in a market 
economy, their existence is premised on nonmarket considerations.  These nonmarket 
considerations “include friendship, affection, altruistic behavior, a sense of 
commitment or belongingness, and family ties.”  Tsilly Dagan, Itemizing Personhood, 29 
VA. TAX REV. 93, 95 (2009).  By default, though, the tax law seeks to limit itself to the 
market sphere.  Id.  By enacting section 501(d), Congress recognized that religious 
and apostolic organizations operated outside of the normal market-oriented world 
that it designed the tax law to capture.  
 213  I.R.C. § 501(d) (2015). 
 214  Id. 
 215  Id. § 1(h)(11)(B)(ii)(I) (2014) (excluding from the definition of “qualified 
dividend income” income paid by corporations exempt from tax under section 501). 
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tax rates.216 
Effectively, the tax regime applicable to religious and apostolic 
organizations differs significantly from the regime that governs public 
charities and private foundations.  Unlike the income of any other tax-
exempt organization, the income of religious and apostolic 
organizations ultimately faces taxation.  Although the organization 
avoids paying taxes, its members must include their pro rata share of 
its income in their gross income.217  In addition, the Code does not 
provide any deduction for donors to religious and apostolic 
organizations.218  Ultimately, the “exemption” for religious and 
apostolic organizations functions more like a pass-through (or quasi-
pass-through) regime than an exemption for public charities.219 
The inclusion of the special tax regime for religious and apostolic 
organizations among tax-exempt organizations should not matter; the 
tax law is clear that economically they function as quasi-pass-through 
entities.  In spite of the law’s clarity, though, the I.R.S. appears to have 
been blinded by its association with tax-exemptions.220  To prevent this 
mischaracterization in the future, Congress should remove the regime 
from section 501 of the Code and, instead, clarify that religious and 
apostolic organizations are not exempt, and thus not subject to the 
general rules of tax exemption. 
V. OTHER TAX REGIMES ARE POOR MATCHES FOR THE ECONOMICS OF 
COMMUNITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS 
While Congress crafted section 501(d) to reflect the economic 
realities of communitarian organizations, its uniqueness may make it 
superfluous.  If section 501(d) serves no distinct purpose that could 
not be served equally well by a different and broader tax regime,221 it 
should be repealed and communitarian organizations should be taxed 
under that broader tax regime.  On the other hand, if no alternative 
 
 216  A high-income member of an exempt religious or apostolic organization may 
have her tax liability on the deemed dividends increased by 3.8 percentage points.  Id. 
§ 1411(a).  The amount of dividends from the religious or apostolic organization—
deemed or not—would not increase their net earnings from self-employment for 
purposes of the Self-Employment Contributions Act, however.  Rev. Rul. 58-328, 1958-
1 C.B. 327. 
 217  I.R.C. § 501(d) (2015). 
 218  See id. § 170(c)(2) (2012) (listing organizations, donations to which qualify as 
deductible charitable contributions). 
 219  See infra notes 236–242. 
 220  See supra Part II. 
 221  See, e.g., Emory & Zelenak, supra note 176, at 1110 (“[S]ection 501(d) may have 
lost most of its importance since the enactment of the unrelated business income 
tax.”).  
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tax regime accurately reflects the economics of communitarian 
groups, section 501(d) serves a purpose that justifies both its continued 
existence and efforts to improve and expand its reach.  To determine 
whether section 501(d) has become superfluous, then, we must 
examine if another tax regime accurately captures the unique 
economics of communitarian organizations. 
A. Corporate Taxation 
Without section 501(d), religious and apostolic organizations 
would be treated as corporations for tax purposes.222  The federal tax 
law imposes two levels of tax on corporate income.  First, a corporation 
pays taxes on its taxable income at marginal rates of up to thirty-five 
percent.223  Second, shareholders pay taxes on the corporate income 
when the corporation distributes that income in the form of 
dividends.224 
Although the modern corporate income tax was originally 
enacted in the early twentieth century,225 economists generally agree 
that it hurts the economy.226  Still, the corporate income tax continues 
to exist and appears unlikely to go away.227  Because it exists, and 
because without section 501(d), communitarian organizations would 
be taxed as corporations, we must evaluate whether the corporate tax 
treatment would constitute an acceptable fit for communitarian 
organizations. 
In spite of the corporate income tax’s economic inefficiencies, its 
existence finds some support in tax policy.  The two principal policy 
justifications for the corporate income tax are a regulatory theory and 
a shareholder theory.228  The regulatory theory dates back to the 
 
 222  See, e.g., Kleinsasser ex rel. Kleinsasser v. United States, 707 F.2d 1024, 1025–26 
(9th Cir. 1983) (“Without § 501(d), the income of a religious [or apostolic] 
corporation . . . would be subject to the regular corporate income tax . . . . .”). 
 223  I.R.C. § 11(a)–(b) (2012). 
 224  Id. § 301(a), (c) (2014). 
 225  STEVEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO SHIELD: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
CORPORATE INCOME TAX, 1861 TO PRESENT 1 (2010).  
 226  MARTIN A. SULLIVAN, CORPORATE TAX REFORM: TAXING PROFITS IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 25 (2011) (“[O]f all the bad taxes out there, economists consider the 
corporate tax the most harmful to economic growth.”).  Among other problems, the 
corporate income tax distorts business decisions, including the choice of business 
form, of retaining or distributing earnings, and of debt or equity financing.  BANK, 
supra note 225, at xii–xiv. 
 227  See MARTIN A. SULLIVAN, CORPORATE TAX REFORM: TAXING PROFITS IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 34–35 (2011). 
 228  Philip T. Hackney, What We Talk About When We Talk About Tax Exemption, 33 VA. 
TAX REV. 115, 118 (2013).  
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corporate excise tax of 1909.229  In essence, the corporate income tax 
seeks to align the actions of managers with the interests of 
shareholders where the managers and shareholders may be different 
people.230 
By contrast, the shareholder theory of corporate taxation sees the 
corporate tax as a means to tax the income of shareholders.  Imposing 
this additional tax on shareholders is justified on ability-to-pay 
grounds: presumably, by virtue of their owning corporate shares, 
shareholders have sufficient wealth to bear these taxes.231 
Neither of these policy considerations applies to communitarian 
organizations, however.  Members of communitarian organizations do 
not have an ownership interest in the organization.  In fact, most 
eschew, fully or partially, the idea of privately-held property in favor of 
holding property together.232 
Without shareholders, communitarian organizations do not have 
a separation between ownership and management that requires 
regulation.  Without shareholders, the managers of communal 
property only have to concern themselves with the good of the 
organization. 
Moreover, without shareholders, an entity-level tax cannot 
function as an additional tax on shareholder income.  In fact, the 
unique structure of section 501(d) does a better job of taxing members 
of religious and apostolic organizations than the corporate income tax 
would: it directly taxes individuals on entity-level income in the year 
the entity earns that income. 
In addition to the policy considerations underlying the continued 
existence of the corporate income tax, as a practical matter, it may be 
necessary.  The federal government uses the corporate income tax to 
raise significant revenue.  In 2015, the federal government raised more 
than $389 billion—or almost twelve percent of its gross collections—
from corporate taxes.233  In addition, it prevents individual taxpayers 
 
 229  Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate Income 
Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 53 (1990) (“The Corporate Excise Tax of 1909 reflects the 
Progressive Era’s attempts to regulate corporations . . . .”).  
 230  Hackney, supra note 228, at 141–42. 
 231  Id. at 140.  The shareholder theory of corporate taxation grounds itself in 
questionable assumptions.  Though the incidence of corporate income taxation is still 
debated, it does not fall solely on shareholders.  Among others, labor and consumers 
might bear some portion of the corporate income tax.  Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1203 
n.34 (2004).  
 232  See supra notes 111–115 and accompanying text. 
 233  I.R.S., 2015 DATA BOOK 3 tbl.1 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/15databk.pdf. 
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from using the formal separation between corporations and 
shareholders to defer or evade taxes.234 
As a practical matter, however, these revenue considerations do 
not provide a compelling reason to tax communitarian organizations 
under the corporate income tax.  Section 501(d) does not permit the 
deferral or evasion of taxes.  In addition, because of the relative scarcity 
of communitarian organizations and because deemed dividends from 
religious and apostolic organizations do not qualify for preferential tax 
rates,235 eliminating the entity level of taxation will not significantly 
reduce federal revenue. 
B. Partnership Tax 
While qualifying religious and apostolic organizations do not pay 
taxes,236 their exemption has a materially different function from other 
tax exemptions.  Notably, the revenue earned by religious and 
apostolic organizations does not escape taxes altogether.  Rather, 
members must include in their gross income their pro rata share of 
the organization’s taxable income, whether or not the organization 
distributes that income.237  In addition, the exemption under section 
501(d) does not provide any deduction to members—or other 
taxpayers—who donate to exempt religious and apostolic 
organizations.238 
In fact, for tax purposes, religious and apostolic organizations 
look more like partnerships than like tax-exempt public charities.  Like 
religious and apostolic organizations, partnerships do not pay taxes on 
 
 234  SULLIVAN, supra note 226, at 35–36.  For example, if corporate income went 
untaxed, an individual who owned a portfolio of dividend—and interest—paying 
securities could incorporate a holding company and transfer her securities to the 
holding company in exchange for shares of the holding company.  Because the 
incorporated holding company is a different person than the shareholder, she would 
no longer be taxable on the income from her portfolio.  At the same time, without a 
corporate income tax, the holding company would not be taxable on the income from 
the portfolio.  The shareholder could still benefit from her investment, though.  As 
the sole shareholder, she could cause the holding company to pay dividends of some 
portion of the return, though she would pay taxes on the dividends received.  
Alternatively, if she wanted to avoid taxation altogether, she could cause the 
corporation to lend her money, or she could borrow from a third party using her 
shares in the corporation as collateral. 
 235  I.R.C. § 1(h)(11)(B)(ii) (2012). 
 236  Id. § 501(a) (2015) (“An organization described in subsection . . . (d) . . . shall 
be exempt from taxation under this subtitle . . . .”).  
 237  Id. § 501(d). 
 238  Lewis D. Solomon & Kimberly J. Benjamin, Intentional Communities: A Primer, 23 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 143, 188 (1996) (“[A] 501(d) organization cannot confer tax 
deductions for donations.”).  
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their income.239  Instead, the partnership’s gains and losses pass 
through to each partner, who must take into account her distributive 
share of such gains and losses in calculating her tax.240  In addition, 
much like members of religious and apostolic organizations, a partner 
must include in her income her distributive share of partnership 
income whether or not the partnership actually distributes that 
income.241  In fact, exempt religious and apostolic organizations appear 
to file the same information tax return as partnerships.242  If the 
partnership tax regime reflected the economics of communitarian 
organizations, then it might make sense to repeal section 501(d) and 
tax religious and apostolic organizations using subchapter K.243  By 
eliminating section 501(d), Congress could simplify the tax law. 
Congress enacted subchapter K to remedy the confusing tax 
treatment of partners and partnerships that existed prior to 1954 and 
to replace it with a regime that provided “simplicity, flexibility, and 
 
 239  I.R.C. § 701 (2012) (“A partnership as such shall not be subject to the income 
tax imposed by this chapter.”).  
 240  Id. § 702(a) (2003). 
 241  Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(a) (1956) (“Each partner is required to take into account 
separately in his return his distributive share, whether or not distributed, of each class 
or item of partnership income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit . . . .”).  
 242  The basis for religious and apostolic organizations’ requirement to file a 
partnership return is not currently clear.  From 1948 until 1971, the Treasury 
regulations mandated it.  See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-34-002 (Apr. 5, 1994).  The 1971 
revision to the regulations removed the explicit requirement, though it is not clear 
what the revised regulations intended with respect to religious and apostolic 
organizations.  Id.  Still, though the regulations no longer state an explicit requirement 
that religious and apostolic organizations file a partnership return, they do provide 
that such an organization needs to file a Form 1065 within four months and fifteen 
days of the close of its taxable year.  Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(e) (as amended in 2015).  
Form 1065 is the information return partnerships are also required to file.  See Treas. 
Reg. § 1.6031(a)-1(a)(1) (as amended in 2005) (requiring partnership to file 
partnership return); I.R.S. Instructions for Form 1065, 2 (2012) (“Form 1065 is an 
information return used to report the income, gains, losses, deductions, credits, etc., 
from the operation of a partnership.”).  The instructions to Form 1065 state that 
religious and apostolic organizations must file a Form 1065.  Id. at 3.  But instructions 
to tax forms are not binding authority, and their use as such would create significant 
administrative law problems.  Armstrong v. Comm’r, 139 T.C. 468, 484 (2012), aff’d, 
745 F.3d 890 (8th Cir. 2014).  Still, even without binding authority, it makes sense for 
religious and apostolic organizations to file a partnership return, notwithstanding the 
fact that they are not partnerships for tax purposes.  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-34-002 
(“Regardless of whether the current regulations are read as mandating the use of Form 
1065 . . . filing as a partnership did not confer partner status on the members.”). 
 243  Subchapter K of the Code governs the taxation of partnerships.  Philip F. 
Postlewaite et al., A Critique of the ALI’s Federal Income Tax Project—Subchapter K: Proposals 
of the Taxation of Partners, 75 GEO. L.J. 423, 424–25 (1986) (“Subchapter K of the 
Internal Revenue Code . . . currently houses sections 701-761, the primary provisions 
addressing partnership taxation.”). 
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equity as between partners.”244  To achieve this simplicity, flexibility, 
and equity, subchapter K essentially treats the partnership as a conduit 
rather than a taxpayer.245  Over the years, Congress has encrusted this 
simple conduit approach with various rules to impede partners from 
shifting tax attributes, including income and deductions, in ways 
Congress considers unacceptable.246 
Though section 501(d) also functions to provide simplicity, 
flexibility, and equity to members of religious and apostolic 
organizations, Congress did not design it with the same conduit theory 
in mind.  Under the conduit taxation of partnerships, for example, 
partnerships pass through to their partners not only a specific amount 
of income, but the character of the income.247  Assume, for example, 
that a partnership earns $100 during the taxable year.  Half of its 
income consists of interest, taxable at ordinary rates.  The other half it 
earns from selling a capital asset it has held for longer than a year, 
which means it will be taxed at long-term capital gains rates.248  A 
partner with a ten percent interest in the partnership will receive an 
allocation of $10; $5 of that amount will be ordinary income, and $5 
will be long-term capital gain.249 
Religious and apostolic organizations, on the other hand, do not 
pass the character of their income through to their members.  Rather, 
members must treat their allocations as dividends, irrespective of the 
actual source.250  Under current tax law, qualified dividends are taxed 
at the lower long-term capital gains rates.251  If the deemed dividends 
 
 244  H.R. REP. No. 1337, at 65 (1954).  
 245  Philip F. Postlewaite, I Come to Bury Subchapter K, Not to Praise It, 54 TAX L. 451, 
452–53 (2001) (“Under Subchapter K, partnerships are subjected to conduit taxation, 
i.e., the enterprise is largely ignored for tax purposes and its owners are subjected to a 
single level of taxation, with maximum flexibility among the partners to order their 
financial affairs.”). 
 246  See Lawrence Lokken, Taxation of Private Business Firms: Imagining a Future 
Without Subchapter K, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 249, 250 (1999); see also Noël B. Cunningham & 
James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV. 1, 5 (2004) 
(“Oversimplified, the regulations assert that there is an overall legislative intent 
underlying subchapter K, and if a partnership is formed or availed of in connection 
with a transaction to substantially reduce federal taxes in a manner inconsistent with 
this intent, the transaction may be recast.”).  
 247  See I.R.C. § 702(b) (2012); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(b) (1956). 
 248  See I.R.C. § 1222(3) (2012). 
 249  The difference is relevant to our taxpayer because ordinary income is taxable 
at a marginal rate of up to 39.6 percent, id. § 1(a)–(d), while long-term capital gain is 
taxable at a rate of not more than twenty percent.  Id. § 1(h)(1)(D) (2014).  For a 
sufficiently high-income partner, both rates would be increased by 3.8 percentage 
points.  Id. § 1411(a).  
 250  See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(d)-1(a) (1958). 
 251  I.R.C. § 1(h)(11)(A) (2012). 
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from religious and apostolic organizations were qualified dividends, 
this dividend treatment would provide the same or better tax 
treatment to members of religious and apostolic groups than partners 
receive.  In the prior example, rather than half the allocation being 
treated as ordinary income, the whole amount would be taxed at long-
term capital gains rates.  The tax law, however, excludes dividends paid 
(or deemed paid) by religious and apostolic organizations from the 
definition of qualified dividend income.252  As a result, any long-term 
capital gains earned by the organization end up transformed into 
ordinary income in the hands of members. 
This deemed dividend treatment also prevents members of 
religious and apostolic organizations from deducting losses suffered by 
the organization.  Consistent with the theory that a partnership is 
merely a conduit for its partners, when a partnership suffers a loss, it 
cannot deduct that loss.253  Instead, it passes its loss through to its 
partners.254  If the loss qualifies as deductible (e.g., it is incurred in the 
partnership’s trade or business), the partners can then deduct the loss 
against their income.255 
Congress did not provide religious and apostolic organizations 
with the ability to pass entity-level losses through to members of the 
organization.  Instead, members receive a deemed dividend of their 
share of organization’s taxable income.256  If a religious or apostolic 
organization has losses, it can use them to reduce its taxable income, 
and thus reduce the deemed dividend to its members, but the 
members themselves cannot receive a distribution, deemed or 
otherwise, of a loss.257 
Whatever Congress’s reason for not providing pure conduit 
treatment to religious and apostolic organizations, this inability to pass 
losses through to its members puts those members of these 
communitarian groups at a disadvantage when compared to partners 
in a partnership, at least in certain circumstances.  If, for example, a 
 
 252  Id. § 1(h)(11)(B)(ii)(I).  
 253  Id. § 701 (2012) (“Persons carrying on business as partners shall be liable for 
income tax only in their separate or individual capacities.”).  
 254  Id. § 702(a)(1)–(3) (partners take into account their distributive share of gains 
and losses). 
 255  See, e.g., id. § 162(a) (2012); § 212 (1954).  The Code places certain limitations, 
however, on partners’ ability to deduct partnership losses.  Id. § 704(d) (2004).  
 256  Id. § 501(d) (2015). 
 257  Religious and apostolic organizations are not alone among quasi-pass-through 
entities that cannot pass losses through.  Regulated investment companies can also use 
losses to reduce their investment company taxable income, but cannot pass those 
losses through to shareholders.  Samuel D. Brunson, Mutual Funds, Fairness, and the 
Income Gap, 65 ALA. L. REV. 139, 154–55 (2013).  
BRUNSON (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/2016  12:04 PM 
174 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:137 
partnership has losses in excess of its gains, partners can use those 
losses to offset income from other sources.258  If a religious or apostolic 
group, on the other hand, has losses in excess of its income, the losses 
will wipe out its taxable income, and members will receive no deemed 
dividend for the year.  Members will not be able to use the excess loss 
to reduce their taxable income from other sources. 
This theoretical disconnect between the taxation of partnerships, 
based on a conduit theory, and the taxation of religious and apostolic 
organizations, where the conduit theory is at best attenuated, reflects 
differences between partnerships and communitarian organizations.  
In general, individuals form partnerships—and invest assets or effort 
to become partners—to jointly carry on business.259  Using a 
partnership to carry on business comes with a cost: partnership 
taxation has become tremendously complex.260  Individuals who form 
partnerships believe that the benefits—including tax benefits—that 
come with the partnership form outweigh the cost and complexity. 
Members of communitarian groups, by contrast, do not join for 
investment purposes, and, while members of communitarian groups 
pool their property to some extent,261 they do not pool it in the same 
way as a traditional partnership.  Rather, they join to participate in a 
community.262  For individuals whose focus is community, not profit, 
subchapter K would require “excessive, often cost-prohibitive, 
expenditures.”263  Requiring unsophisticated communitarians to bear 
such prohibitive costs could impede their ability to create 
communitarian societies.264 
Because partners form and invest in partnerships with the 
intention of earning a profit, they expect to receive some portion of 
their capital back upon dissociation (unless the partnership is 
 
 258  Id. at 154. 
 259  UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202(a), 6 pt. I U.L.A. 92 (1997); see also Treas. Reg. § 
301.7701-3(a) (2006) (providing that a “business entity” can be classified as a 
partnership for tax purposes).  
 260  Andrea Monroe, The New Revolution in Partnership Tax?, 33 VA. TAX REV. 269, 272 
(2013) (“The hallmark of subchapter K today is complexity.”).  
 261  This pooling can range from the Hutterites, who share virtually all of their 
property, to groups whose members maintain private finances but pool their assets for 
common expenses.  MILLER, QUEST FOR UTOPIA, supra note 9, at xxi. 
 262  Id. at xix (Communitarians “choose to live together and share at least some of 
their resources for the common good or for the betterment of the world”). 
 263  Monroe, supra note 260, at 272. 
 264  Moreover, if communitarians wanted to use subchapter K, nothing prevents 
them from forming an entity, electing partnership taxation, and incurring the costs of 
compliance as they receive the benefits of true pass-through taxation. 
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insolvent).265  Members of many religious and apostolic organizations, 
on the other hand, have no equity-like interest in the religious or 
apostolic organization, and have no expectation of receiving any 
distribution upon leaving or upon the termination of the group.266 
Ultimately, the structure of religious and apostolic organizations 
differs too significantly from the structure of business entities taxed as 
partnerships to make subchapter K an apposite taxing regime for 
communitarian organizations.  Congress deliberately decided that 
religious and apostolic organizations should not act as pure conduits 
for tax purposes.  This conclusion makes practical sense, as the 
organization does not function primarily to aggregate individual 
investors’ investments.  Rather, communitarian organizations permit 
their members to share assets in a flexible manner. 
C. Tax-Exempt Churches 
Even if partnership taxation is unavailable to religious and 
apostolic organizations, section 501(d) could still be superfluous.  If a 
communitarian religious organization could demonstrate that it was 
“organized and operated exclusively for religious . . . purposes,”267 the 
organization would not only enjoy tax exemption itself, but its income 
would not pass through to members.  As an additional benefit, 
members who donated their property to the organization could 
potentially deduct that donation.268 
In fact, Meade Emory and Lawrence Zelenak argue that, as a 
result of the unrelated business income tax, section 501(d) has become 
largely superfluous.269  The cases denying an exemption as a church to 
the Hutterites and the Israelite House of David occurred before the 
enactment of the unrelated business income tax.270  These cases 
reflected a common unease with the idea of charitable organizations 
 
 265  See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 701(a), 807(a), 6 pt. I U.L.A. 175, 206 (1997).  
 266  See, e.g., van den Berghe & Peter, supra note 156, at 534 (“Defecting Hutterites 
leave with little more than their clothes.”).  Cf. Hackney, supra note 228, at 121 (“There 
are no ‘owners’ of a nonprofit organization; consequently, we cannot use a pass-
through taxation system like we do for partnership where it is clear who owns the 
firm.”).  
 267  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2015). 
 268  See id. § 170(a) (2012).  It is worth noting that, even if a member itemized her 
deductions, she may not be eligible to fully deduct her donations.  She can only deduct 
charitable contributions of up to fifty percent of her adjusted gross income.  Id. § 
170(b)(1)(A). 
 269  Emory & Zelenak, supra note 176, at 1110 (“In any event, section 501(d) may 
have lost most of its importance since the enactment of the unrelated business income 
tax.”).  
 270  Id. 
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earning money and, by implication, competing unfairly with for-profit 
businesses.271  The courts found that the organizations’ business 
operations “constituted a substantial non-exempt purpose.”272 
The unrelated business income tax, originally enacted in 1950,273 
taxes otherwise tax-exempt organizations on income they earn from 
carrying on a trade or business.274  With the introduction of the 
unrelated business income tax, Emory and Zelenak argue, the I.R.S. 
recognized that the “operation of a trade or business is not a bar to 
exempt status.”275 
If the unrelated business income tax truly removed the bar from 
tax-exempt public charities’ engaging in business, then it becomes 
necessary to explore whether section 501(d) provides benefits 
different from those provided by section 501(c)(3).  If not, Congress 
could simplify the Code by eliminating section 501(d) and allowing 
qualifying religious and apostolic organizations to roll their 
exemptions over into section 501(c)(3).  Put a different way, if 
religious and apostolic organizations could be exempt under section 
501(c)(3), do they need section 501(d)? 
Under current law, yes.  True, the Code’s requirement that public 
charities exempt under section 501(c)(3) be organized and operated 
exclusively for exempt purposes does not, in fact, prevent them from 
engaging in some amount of non-exempt business.  The operational 
test instead interprets the “exclusivity” criterion as requiring an 
exempt public charity to engage primarily in activities that accomplish 
its exempt purpose or purposes.276 
The Treasury regulations suggest, though, that religious and 
apostolic organizations would not meet even this less-strict operational 
test.  The regulations do acknowledge explicitly that an organization 
may qualify for exemption under section 501(c)(3) even if it “operates 
a trade or business as a substantial part of its activities.”277  However, the 
trade or business must further the organization’s exempt purposes, 
and its primary purpose cannot be to operate such a trade or 
business.278  As the courts noted, the Hutterite groups carried on 
 
 271  Id. at 1109 n.155.  
 272  Id. at 1109–10. 
 273  Ethan G. Stone, Adhering to the Old Line: Uncovering the History and Political 
Function of the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 54 EMORY L.J. 1475, 1479 (2005).  
 274  Brunson, Tax Havens, supra note 174, at 229–30.  
 275  Emory & Zelenak, supra note 176, at 1110.  
 276  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(c)(1) (2014). 
 277  Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(1). 
 278  Id. 
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significant business, with the purpose of supporting their members 
and purchasing property.279  Equally damning, the regulations appear 
to specifically exclude religious and apostolic organizations from 
qualifying under section 501(c)(3): 
An organization which is organized and operated for the 
primary purpose of carrying on an unrelated trade or business 
is not exempt under section 501(c)(3) even though it has 
certain religious purposes, its property is held in common, and 
its profits do not inure to the benefit of individual members of 
the organization.  See, however, section 501(d) . . . , relating to 
religious and apostolic organizations.280 
Even without these explicit regulations, though, religious and 
apostolic groups could face significant impediments in attempting to 
claim an exemption under section 501(c)(3).  The passage of the 
unrelated business income tax did not eliminate the operational test.  
The operational test requires public charities to engage primarily in 
activities that accomplish an exempt purpose.281 
The operational test also includes a prohibition on private 
inurement.282  In addition, a tax-exempt entity must act to further a 
public, not private, interest.283  Under the prohibition of private 
inurement, no part of a tax-exempt entity’s net earnings can inure to 
“the benefit of private shareholders or individuals.”284  The Treasury 
regulations define such private shareholders or individuals as those 
with a “personal and private interest in the activities of the 
organization.”285  In general, courts have found that a person has this 
personal and private interest “only if she can exert control over the 
charity’s operations.”286 
The private inurement prohibition may, in some cases, cause 
 
 279  Hutterite Bruder Gemeinde v. Comm’r, 1 B.T.A. 1208, 1211 (1925) (“There is 
no evidence that any of the funds of the taxpayer have ever been used to spread the 
doctrines of the Hutterische Bruder Gemeinde beyond the boundaries of the 
taxpayer’s property or devoted to any service valuable to the general public.”); Hofer 
v. United States, 64 Ct. Cl. 672, 684 (1928) (“[The net income] was for the benefit of 
its members.”).  
 280  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(e)(1) (2014).  
 281  Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1). 
 282  Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(c)(2). 
 283  Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (“An organization is not organized or operated 
exclusively for one or more of the [exempt] purposes . . . unless it serves a public 
rather than a private interest.”). 
 284  Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(c)(2). 
 285  Id. § 1.501(a)-1(c). 
 286  Johnny Rex Buckles, The Federalization of the Duty of Loyalty Governing Charity 
Fiduciaries Under United States Tax Law, 99 KY. L.J. 645, 660 (2011).  
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religious and apostolic groups to fail the operational test, depending 
on their governance.  Presumably, those who run the common treasury 
are part of the community and share in the organization’s income and 
assets in the same way as non-controlling members.  To the extent they 
do, such religious or apostolic organizations would fail to qualify under 
section 501(c)(3); the private inurement prohibition has no safe 
harbor, even for de minimis amounts.287  Theoretically, of course, a 
religious or apostolic organization that wanted to qualify under section 
501(c)(3) could structure its governance in a way that did not 
implicate the private inurement prohibition, but turning over the 
management of communal assets to outsiders would presumably 
contravene its preferred method of allocating income to its 
membership and its preferred governance structure. 
Even if a religious or apostolic group structured its governance 
and its allocations in a way that satisfied the operational test, however, 
it would likely violate the prohibition on excessive private benefit.  
Unlike the prohibition on private inurement, an exempt organization 
cannot be organized for the private benefit of any person or groups of 
people, not just those individuals who exercise control over the 
organization.288  Still, the prohibition on private benefit does not 
entirely prohibit private benefit; rather, it only disqualifies an 
organization that provides more than incidental private benefit.289 
The primary benefits of income from the communally-owned 
property flow to members of the organizations, and not to the general 
public.290  Of course, providing benefits to a circumscribed group does 
not always cause an organization to fail the private benefit test.291  To 
demonstrate that it does not provide an excessive public benefit, 
however, a religious or apostolic organization would need to 
demonstrate the “definiteness and charitable nature of the class to be 
benefited.”292  Members of a religious or apostolic group are unlikely 
 
 287  Id. (“There is no de minimis safe harbor under the statute.”).  
 288  Id. 
 289  Id. (“[T]he bestowal of an ‘incidental’ private benefit does not disqualify an 
organization from section 501(c)(3) under the private benefit doctrine.”). 
 290  See Hutterische Bruder Gemeinde v. Comm’r, 1 B.T.A. 1208, 1211 (1925) (“It is 
difficult to discover any benefit to the public flowing from the activities of this 
[communitarian religious group].”).  
 291  See, e.g., Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1075 (1989) (“[W]e 
have found that organizations which further exempt purposes through sponsoring 
legal or medical referral services did not confer private benefits so long as the referral 
service was open to a broad representation of professionals and no select group of 
professionals were the primary beneficiaries of the service.”).  
 292  Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 202, 215 (1978) (suggesting such 
demonstration can resolve whether an organization serves a private interest or its 
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to qualify as a charitable class.  Even if they did, though, the tax law 
requires these benefits to flow to any member of the charitable class 
without selectivity toward the particular individuals who benefit.293  
Religious and apostolic organizations generally limit benefits to 
members of the organization and select recipients specifically 
according to their needs.  As a result, a religious or apostolic 
organization is unlikely to qualify for a tax exemption under section 
501(c)(3).294 
Religious and apostolic organizations would not have an easier 
time meeting the requirements of section 501(c)(3) by virtue of being, 
or associating closely with, churches.  Admittedly, Congress requires 
the I.R.S. to treat churches differently from non-church charities.  The 
tax law differentiates non-church religious organizations from 
churches.  Today, there are three principal differences between 
churches and non-church religious organizations for tax purposes.  
First, churches do not need to apply for a tax exemption and, in fact, 
are presumed to be public charities rather than private foundations.295  
Second, churches do not need to file returns with the I.R.S.296  Finally, 
the I.R.S. faces significant restrictions on its ability to audit churches 
and on the church audits themselves.297 
In spite of the special protections churches enjoy, however, they 
must still meet the requirements of section 501(c)(3), or they lose 
their tax exemption.298  And even a church, to the extent it owned and 
operated businesses, the profit from which provided for its members’ 
livelihoods, would risk failing to qualify under section 501(c)(3).  
Churches can, of course, provide financial support to the poor and 
needy.  Such support falls comfortably within the ambit of section 
501(c)(3)’s exempt purposes.299  Yet providing financial support for 
the entire body of membership goes beyond merely providing for the 
poor and needy: it provides substantial benefits to members.  These 
benefits—even if relatively modest—cause putative churches to fail the 
 
“activities are conducted for private gain”), acq. in result, 1981-2 C.B.   
 293  Id. at 215–16.  
 294  See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(iii) (2014) (providing examples of 
putative tax-exempt organizations that serve a private, rather than public, benefit). 
 295  I.R.C. § 508(a)-(c) (2012). 
 296  Id. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) (2015).  
 297  Id. § 7611 (1998). 
 298  See, e.g., Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 139 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(upholding I.R.S.’s revocation of a “bona fide church’s tax-exempt status because of 
its involvement in politics”).  
 299  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (2014) (“[Charity] includes: Relief of the 
poor and distressed or of the underprivileged . . . .”). 
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private inurement test and the operations test.300 
In addition, if a religious or apostolic organization wanted 
exemption under section 501(c)(3), it would have to meet the public 
policy requirement.  While the I.R.S. currently applies the public policy 
requirement to religious and apostolic organizations,301 it overreaches 
in doing so.  Neither the tax law nor any tax policy requires 
communitarian organizations to meet the public policy requirement.302  
Although the I.R.S. overreaches in holding religious and apostolic 
organizations to the public policy requirement, the requirement 
clearly applies to organizations seeking an exemption under section 
501(c)(3).303 
The I.R.S. still polices whether tax-exempt organizations meet the 
public policy requirement.  In 2013, the I.R.S. denied section 
501(c)(3) tax-exempt status to Principle Voices of Polygamy, a putative 
educational and charitable organization formed to provide education 
about polygamous families and cultures, empower polygamous 
individuals and families, and provide crisis referrals to polygamists.304  
Using analysis similar to that used to deny section 501(d) status to the 
FLDS Church, the I.R.S. again stated that polygamy contravenes long-
standing federal policy.305  Since Principle Voices of Polygamy is 
“operated to condone and support those engaging in the illegal act of 
 
 300  See Canada v. Comm’r, 82 T.C. 973, 988 (1984) (“We do not doubt that one 
purpose for which the KLCC was operated was to permit members to explore various 
religions . . . .  [However,] it is clear that, on the whole, the KLCC was operated, to 
more than an insubstantial degree, for nonexempt purposes and that it afforded its 
members benefits which violated the ‘private inurement’ test.”); see also Ohnmeiss v. 
Comm’r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1350 (1991) (“[T]he applicability of the ‘private 
inurement’ test did not turn upon the amount or extent of the benefits conferred but 
only on the question of whether there were benefits of any kind.”).  
 301  See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-100-47 (Dec. 11, 2012) (denying exemption 
under section 501(d) to a polygamous group that otherwise qualifies for the 
exemption).  
 302  See supra notes 108–110 and accompanying text. 
 303  See supra notes 22–38 and accompanying text. 
 304  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-23-025 (Mar. 14, 2013).  As with the FLDS Church 
private letter ruling, the I.R.S. was required to redact potentially identifying 
information in the private letter ruling.  See supra note 87 and accompanying text.  As 
with that private letter ruling, however, the I.R.S. carelessly failed to redact certain 
identifying information.  The private letter ruling quotes the organization’s website, 
including its message that it seeks “decriminalization of polygamy by . . . the removal 
or appropriate alteration of laws specifically targeting polygamists.”  Id.  Although the 
Principle Voices of Polygamy website appears to have been taken down, a search for 
the quoted language attributes it to Principle Voices of Polygamy.  See Principle Voices, 
APOLOGETICSINDEX (Sep. 17, 2008), http://www.apologeticsindex.org/137-principle-
voices. 
 305  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-23-025 (Mar. 14, 2013). 
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polygamy [it] cannot be exempt under section 501(c)(3).”306 
The I.R.S. is undoubtedly correct that polygamy violates federal 
public policy.307  Supreme Court precedent is abundantly clear that the 
common law of charity excludes groups that violate public policy from 
the definition of “charitable.”308  Additionally, for an organization to 
qualify under section 501(c)(3), it must meet the common law 
definition of charitable.309  If the FLDS Church itself owned the 
common property and claimed an exemption as a church, it would 
likely fail to qualify for exemption under section 501(c)(3), 
notwithstanding the lower threshold for qualification and the higher 
threshold for audit.310  Even without the regulations denying the 
possibility of a religious or apostolic organization qualifying for section 
501(c)(3) status,311 churches face the same requirements—including 
the public policy requirement—as non-church public charities.312  In 
fact, the I.R.S. is clear that it believes it has the authority and duty to 
revoke a church’s tax-exempt status if that church acts in a way that 
violates public policy.313 
VI. UPDATING SECTION 501(D) 
Congress originally exempted religious and apostolic 
organizations from tax in 1936.314  When it first enacted the 
predecessor to section 501(d), it probably did effectively exempt all of 
an apostolic or religious organization’s income from taxation.  Under 
the Revenue Act of 1936, individuals paid a normal tax of four percent 
 
 306  Id. 
 307  Whether it should is an entirely different question.  See Brunson, Taxing 
Polygamy, supra note 4, at 131. 
 308  Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) (“A corollary to the 
public benefit principle is the requirement, long recognized in the law of trusts, that 
the purpose of a charitable trust may not be illegal or violate established public 
policy.”).  
 309  Id. at 595–96 (“Whatever may be the rationale for such private schools’ policies, 
and however sincere the rationale may be, racial discrimination in education is 
contrary to public policy.  Racially discriminatory educational institutions cannot be 
viewed as conferring a public benefit within the ‘charitable’ concept discussed earlier, 
or within the congressional intent underlying . . . § 501(c)(3).”).  
 310  See supra notes 295–297 and accompanying text. 
 311  See supra note 280 and accompanying text. 
 312  See supra note 298 and accompanying text. 
 313  Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B. 158 (finding that church Z, which operates 
racially-discriminatory schools, fails to “qualif[y] as a charity for Federal income tax 
deduction and exemption purposes under section[] . . . 501(c)(3) of the Code”).  
 314  Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 101(18), 49 Stat. 1648, 1675–76; see also IRM 
7.25.23.2 (Feb. 23, 1999) (“This provision dates back to the Revenue Act of 1936 . . . .”). 
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of their net income.315  In addition, the Revenue Act of 1936 imposed 
a graduated surtax, ranging from an additional four percent on 
income between $4,000 and $6,000 to seventy-five percent on income 
in excess of $5 million.316 
Prior to World War II, though, the income tax was a class, rather 
than a mass, tax.317  Although the four percent normal tax theoretically 
applied to a taxpayer’s first dollar of income, the Revenue Act of 1936 
provided a personal exemption of $1,000 for an individual, or $2,500 
for a married couple, against both the normal tax and the surtax.318  In 
addition, taxpayers received a $400 credit for each dependent.319  
According to the 1940 Census, the median family wage income in 1939 
was $1,231.320  Unless members of religious and apostolic organizations 
earned above-median wages, they likely did not pay the individual 
income taxes or surtaxes.  Like most Americans, their income, instead, 
went untaxed.321 
Today’s federal income tax environment differs radically from the 
income tax of the pre-World War II world.  The Code has grown 
significantly in scope and complexity.322  Similarly, its reach has 
expanded dramatically: at no point during the 1930s did more than 
five percent of Americans pay federal income tax.323  By 2010, more 
than ten times that percentage paid federal income taxes.324  Likewise, 
in 1940, federal income tax receipts accounted for less than fourteen 
percent of federal revenue,325 while in 2010, it accounted for forty-two 
 
 315  Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 11, 49 Stat. 1653. 
 316  Id. § 12, 49 Stat. at 1653–55. 
 317  JOSEPH J. THORNDIKE, THEIR FAIR SHARE: TAXING THE RICH IN THE AGE OF FDR 231 
(2013) (“The broad-based, individual income tax was the defining characteristic of the 
World War II tax regime.”).  
 318  Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 25(b)(1), 49 Stat. 1663. 
 319  Id. § 25(b)(2), 49 Stat. at 1663. 
 320  Sara LaLumia, The Effects of Joint Taxation of Married Couples on Labor Supply and 
Non-Wage Income, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1698, 1703 (2008).  
 321  Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion 
of the Income Tax During World War II, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685, 685 (1988/89) (“During the 
1930s, no more than five percent of Americans were income taxpayers.”).  
 322  See, e.g., Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax Complexity, Reform, and the Illusions of Tax 
Simplification, 2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 319, 319–20 (1994) (“In the post-[World 
War II] era, especially during the 1970s and 1980s, the level of complexity of the 
income tax increased dramatically.”).  
 323  Jones, supra note 321, at 685 (“During the 1930s, no more than five percent of 
Americans were income taxpayers.”). 
 324  Michael M. Gleeson, Larger Percentage of Americans to Pay Income Taxes in 2014, 
140 TAX NOTES 987, 987 (2013) (stating that in 2010, approximately fifty-two percent 
of Americans paid the federal income tax). 
 325  STEVEN A. BANK ET AL., WAR AND TAXES 95 (2008) (“Between 1940 and 1956 . . . 
[the federal income tax’s] yield soar[ed] from $13.6 billion to $40.7 billion.”). 
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percent of federal revenue.326 
In spite of the radical changes to the nature of the federal income 
tax between the pre-World War II era and today, the current version of 
section 501(d) is nearly identical to what Congress enacted originally 
in 1936.327  Even though Congress has not tinkered with section 501(d), 
it mostly functions well in its current form, reflecting the unique 
economics of communitarian organizations.  That said, there are 
certain changes that, in addition to correcting its ambiguities and the 
I.R.S.’s misapplication of the public policy doctrine, would improve 
section 501(d).  Expanding the availability of section 501(d) would 
also provide Congress a convenient opportunity to update and 
improve the provision in light of the massive structural changes to the 
overall tax law that have occurred between its original enactment and 
today. 
A. Religious or Apostolic (or Not) 
Religious individuals are not the only Americans who have 
pursued communal living.  Non-religious communitarian groups have 
a long history in the United States,328 and even today, certain groups of 
people look at communitarian living as an attractive alternative to 
standard contemporary American life.329  Although Congress appears 
 
 326  Andrea Louise Campbell, America the Undertaxed: U.S. Fiscal Policy in Perspective, 
91 FOREIGN AFF. 99, 103 (Sept.–Oct. 2012). 
 327  Comparing the language of the provision as originally enacted and as it exists 
today shows that the only change, besides an introductory phrase that has been added, 
is the amendment of “net income” in the original version to “taxable income” today.  
A blackline comparison between the language of section 101(18) of the Revenue Act 
of 1936 and I.R.C. § 501(d) (with additions marked by underlining and deletions by 
strike-through) looks like this: 
The following organizations are referred to in subsection (a): Religious or 
apostolic associations or corporations, if such associations or corporations 
have a common treasury or community treasury, even if such associations or 
corporations engage in business for the common benefit of the members, 
but only if the members thereof include (at the time of filing their returns) 
in their gross income their entire pro-_rata shares, whether distributed or 
not, of the nettaxable income of the association or corporation for such year.  
Any amount so included in the gross income of a member shall be treated as 
a dividend received. 
 328  In 1844, Brook Farm embraced Fourierism, a non-religious communalist 
movement.  See Carl J. Guarneri, Brook Farm and the Fourieriest Phalanxes: Immediatism, 
Gradualism, and American Utopian Socialism, in AMERICA’S COMMUNAL UTOPIAS 159, 161–
63 (Donald E. Pitzer ed., 1997).  The late nineteenth century saw the rise of 
communitarian single-tax enclaves.  MILLER, QUEST FOR UTOPIA, supra note 9, at 31.  By 
the 1960s and 1970s, secular communes exploded with the rise of the hippies.  Id. at 
198.  
 329  See, e.g., supra notes 141–144 and accompanying text. 
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to have designed section 501(d) specifically with high-visibility 
religious communitarian groups in mind,330 there was no compelling 
reason to limit its availability solely to such groups. 
Not only is there no compelling reason to limit section 501(d) to 
religious communitarian groups, but the current structure of section 
501(d) may violate the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.331  
While tax policy, standing on its own, justifies the expansion of the 
section 501(d) exemption to secular communitarian organizations, 
the Establishment Clause may demand such an expansion.  Although 
analyzing section 501(d) in light of the Establishment Clause goes 
beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth briefly laying out why 
section 501(d) likely violates the Constitution. 
Though the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence is, at best, incoherent,332 the Court has consistently held 
that the Constitution permits tax provisions that benefit religion.333  At 
the same time, though, those tax benefits must serve a secular purpose 
and must be available broadly, not just to religious groups, but to non-
sectarian ones, too.334 
As currently constituted, section 501(d) violates this test.  It is 
available only to “religious or apostolic associations or corporations.”335  
Although the Code does not explicitly define “religious or apostolic,” 
such terms cannot reasonably be read as including secular 
organizations.336 
Congress could easily deal with any potential Establishment 
 
 330  See supra notes 190–193 and accompanying text. 
 331  U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion . . . .”).  
 332  See PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE: LAW RELIGION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 
xxvii (2011) (“[T]he central doctrinal approaches to the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment . . . whatever their practical merits, are 
intellectually inconsistent and ultimately incoherent.”).  
 333  See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970) (“It appears that at least up 
to 1885 this Court, reflecting more than a century of our history and uninterrupted 
practice, accepted without discussion the proposition that federal or state grants of tax 
exemption to churches were not a violation of the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment. As to the New York statute, we now confirm that view.”).  
 334  Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1989) (“Insofar as that 
subsidy is conferred upon a wide array of nonsectarian groups as well as religious 
organizations in pursuit of some legitimate secular end, the fact that religious groups 
benefit incidentally does not deprive the subsidy of the secular purpose and primary 
effect mandated by the Establishment Clause.”).  
 335  I.R.C. § 501(d) (2015). 
 336  Cf. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1071 
(W.D. Wisc. 2013) (“In this case, no reasonable construction of § 107 would include 
atheists.”), vacated, 773 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2014).  
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Clause issue in one of two ways.  On the one hand, it could repeal 
section 501(d).  Without section 501(d), however, no tax regime would 
accurately reflect the economics of communitarian organizations, 
whether religious or not.337  As such, entirely eliminating section 
501(d), while solving the Establishment Clause problem, is not a good 
solution from a tax perspective. 
Expanding section 501(d) to include any qualifying 
communitarian organization, irrespective of ideology, would also 
eliminate any potential Establishment Clause problems.  Admittedly it 
would continue to provide a tax benefit to religious groups, but the 
Establishment Clause does not prevent religious groups from enjoying 
beneficial tax treatment.338  Rather, violation occurs when such benefits 
are available exclusively to religious organizations.339  Expanding the 
availability of section 501(d) beyond religious organizations, then, 
would allow section 501(d) to pass constitutional muster. 
Tax policy considerations also militate in favor of expanding the 
exemption to include non-religious communitarian organizations.  
Horizontal equity (the idea that similarly-situated taxpayers should 
face similar tax burdens)340 clearly supports treating religious and non-
religious communitarian groups the same way for tax purposes.  As a 
nearly universal matter, tax policymakers view horizontal equity as an 
important goal in designing tax regimes.341 
Although widespread, the use of horizontal equity in determining 
how to impose taxes is also controversial.  One school of tax policy 
theorists argues that horizontal equity has no theoretical justification 
or foundation as a stand-alone norm.342  Another disputes the dismissal 
of horizontal equity, arguing that it has something important to say in 
the design of a tax regime.343  Answering the question of whether 
 
 337  See supra Part V. 
 338  Texas Monthly, Inc., 489 U.S. at 14–15.  
 339  Id. at 14. 
 340  See Brunson, Taxing Polygamy, supra note 4, at 124 (“[T]he tax norm of 
horizontal equity . . . holds that taxpayers with similar income should pay a similar 
amount of taxes.”). 
 341  See, e.g., David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 43, 43 (2006) (“[Horizontal equity] is universally accepted as one of the 
more significant criteria of a ‘good tax.’”). 
 342  See, e.g., id. at 89 (“If, on the other hand, horizontal equity is a goal to strive 
for—a claim which has yet to be proven—then its normative grounding would be in 
direct conflict with that of vertical equity.”); Louis Kaplow, A Note on Horizontal Equity, 
1 FLA. TAX REV. 191, 191 (1992) (“The gap in the literature [seeking to justify the 
horizontal equity norm] remains . . . .”).  
 343  See, e.g., Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT’L TAX J. 113, 
114 (1990) (“The independent role of [horizontal equity] becomes apparent once 
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horizontal equity should underlie decisions of how to tax individuals 
and entities is beyond the scope of this Article.  It is also unnecessary 
to my conclusions that Congress should make section 501(d) 
exemption available to non-religious communitarian organizations.  
Even if commentators could definitively demonstrate that horizontal 
equity had no place in the design of tax regimes, a tax regime should 
treat identically-situated taxpayers identically.344 
In determining whether two taxpayers are identical, Professor 
David Elkins argues that differences in “income, consumption 
patterns, marital status or place of residence” break the necessary 
identity between two taxpayers.345  Some differences, however, must be 
irrelevant for tax purposes.  If not, the idea of identical taxpayers 
becomes meaningless.  Presumably, for example, differences in gender 
or race should not produce differences in tax liability, because such 
differences have no relation to a person’s ability or duty to pay taxes.346 
Similarly, there is no tax-relevant difference between a religious 
communitarian group where the members contribute all of their assets 
to a common treasury and receive support from that treasury, and a 
non-religious communitarian group where members contribute to and 
receive from an identical common treasury.  The religious/secular 
divide does not change the economics of the communities, nor does it 
create any cognizable difference for tax purposes. 
Notwithstanding the potential for identical religious and non-
religious communitarian organizations, they will almost certainly 
differ, whether in size, in organizational structure, or in the type of 
business in which they engage.  Even if we accept that horizontal equity 
should not be treated as a stand-alone tax norm, however, these 
potential differences do not counter the conclusion that a section 
501(d) election should be available to qualifying non-religious 
communitarian groups.  Section 501(d) already applies broadly: 
 
focus on an optimal outcome is replaced by comparison of second-best solutions.”). 
 344  Elkins, supra note 341, at 44 (“Tautologically, any conceivable tax arrangement 
will treat identically situated taxpayers equally.”).  
 345  Id.  
 346  That such differences should not have tax relevance does not mean, however, 
that they do not.  Professor Dorothy Brown, for example, has demonstrated that the 
benefits and burdens of taxes are distributed differently depending on race and 
gender.  See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 
329, 332 (2009) (“Government subsidies for homeownership, especially federal tax 
subsidies, create winners and losers generally along race and class lines.”); Dorothy A. 
Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature: The Joint Return, 54 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1469, 1512 (1997) (“[T]his Article shows how the gender bias literature’s 
focus on wives as secondary wage earners ignores how federal tax laws benefit upper-
income white families and penalize African-American families . . . .”).  
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religious communitarian groups’ structures and economics vary, and yet 
these differing economics all fit within the ambit of section 501(d) as 
long as they have a common treasury.  The differences between 
religious incentives to enter a communitarian organization and other 
incentives should not matter for tax purposes. 
Eliminating the “religious or apostolic” requirement would 
provide benefits beyond meeting the policy requirements of horizontal 
equity, though.  By expanding the availability of section 501(d) to non-
religious communitarian organizations, Congress would eliminate any 
potential violation of the Establishment Clause.347 
Eliminating the “religious or apostolic” requirement would also 
significantly reduce the uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding which 
groups qualify under section 501(d).348  Uncertainty imposes real and 
significant costs on taxpayers and on the public.349  Although section 
501(d) and its predecessors have only been available to religious or 
apostolic organizations since the provision’s inception in 1936,350 
neither Congress nor the Treasury Department has seen fit to define 
the terms.351  If Congress makes section 501(d) available to non-
religious communitarian organizations, it will never need to make such 
a definition and will eliminate a significant source of uncertainty for 
communitarian organizations. 
B. Reducing Ambiguity 
Although section 501(d) functions well enough, after more than 
three-quarters of a century, there are other details that merit 
examination and possible change.  These changes will not only 
improve the effectiveness of the statutory scheme applicable to 
communitarian groups, but they may also reduce the incentives to use 
exempt communitarian groups as vehicles for tax avoidance. 
As discussed above, by eliminating the requirement that an entity 
qualify as “religious or apostolic” for exemption under section 501(d), 
Congress would significantly diminish the ambiguity and uncertainty 
in the provision.352  It would also eliminate this uncertainty without 
needing to draft a definition.  “Religious or apostolic” is not, however, 
 
 347  See supra notes 338–339 and accompanying text. 
 348  See supra notes 200–203 and accompanying text. 
 349  Leandra Lederman & Ted Sichelman, Enforcement as Substance in Tax Compliance, 
70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1679, 1732–33 (2013).  
 350  See Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, §101(18), 49 Stat. 1648, 1675. 
 351  See I.R.C. § 501(d) (2015) (includes no definition of religious or apostolic); Treas. 
Reg. § 1.501(d)-1 (1960) (includes no definition of religious or apostolic); see also Twin 
Oaks Cmty., Inc. v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1233, 1244 (1986), acq., 1987-2 C.B. 1. 
 352  See supra Part VI.A. 
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the only source of uncertainty and ambiguity in section 501(d).  A 
qualifying organization must also have a “common treasury or 
community treasury.”353  Neither Congress nor the Treasury 
Department has deigned to define those terms, however.354 
Unlike “religious or apostolic,” Congress cannot—and should 
not—write “common or community treasury” out of the Code.  The 
idea of a common treasury, used to provide for members of the 
communitarian organization, is the principal reason for section 
501(d).  If these organizations operated like normal corporations or 
normal partnerships, distributing or allocating their income pro rata 
according to equity-holders’ interests, section 501(d) would be 
unnecessary.  At the same time, though, eliminating 501(d) would 
flatten the range of economic structures available to communitarian 
groups, impoverishing economic experimentation. 
To reduce the uncertainty created by the treasury requirement, 
Congress must define what it means by “common treasury or 
community treasury.”355  Though the current Congress has no access to 
the original legislative intent in passing the predecessor to section 
501(d), it can use its experience over the lifetime of the exemption to 
draft a definition that would work for communitarian groups today.  
The Tax Court provided a sensible starting point for that definition, 
holding that 
an organization has a “common treasury” or “community 
treasury,” as used in section 501(d), when all of the income 
generated internally by community-operated businesses and 
any income generated from property owned by the 
organization is placed into a common fund that is maintained 
by such organization and is used for the maintenance and 
support of its members, with all members having equal, 
undivided interests in this common fund, but no right to claim 
title to any part thereof.356 
Although the Tax Court’s definition provides a good starting 
 
 353  I.R.C. § 501(d) (2015). 
 354  Twin Oaks Cmty., Inc., 87 T.C. at 1243 (“Unfortunately, these terms are not 
defined in the Code or in the regulations.”).  
 355  Alternatively, to the extent it does not want to or cannot define the terms, it 
could instruct the Treasury Department to define them.  I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2012) 
(“[T]he Secretary [of the Treasury] shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations 
for the enforcement of this title . . . .”).  Congress can explicitly instruct the Treasury 
Department to issue this type of legislative regulation.  See, e.g., id. § 475(g) (2002) 
(“The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to 
carry out the purposes of this section . . . .”).  
 356  Twin Oaks Cmty., Inc., 87 T.C. at 1254.  
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point, Congress should nonetheless use caution before adopting it 
wholesale.  In defining a common or community treasury, Congress 
should clarify that a qualifying communitarian organization need not 
allocate or distribute its income evenly among members.  Such groups 
should have the flexibility, if they so desire, to allocate assets to their 
members according to some definition of need, rather than being 
required to allocate evenly or according to some sense of dessert.357 
To ensure that qualifying communitarian organizations maintain 
this flexibility, the definition of common or community treasury 
should clarify that a qualifying communitarian organization cannot 
maintain anything akin to a capital account.  Allocations and 
distributions to members must have no relation to the amount that the 
members contributed to the communitarian group, whether upon 
joining or subsequently.  The tax law should allow communitarian 
organizations to remain flexible in their approach to allocations and 
distributions, not requiring, for example, that they only take into 
account need.  But an organization that merely wants to allocate 
income according to investment already has a tax-advantaged vehicle 
available: such taxpayers can and should use subchapter K instead. 
Finally, the definition of common or community treasury must 
make clear that members have no ongoing ownership interest in their 
contributions.358  This becomes important when members leave, or 
when the communitarian organization dissolves.  Though some 
communitarian organizations do not distribute anything to departing 
members,359 the tax law should not mandate non-distribution.  No tax 
policy justification exists for preventing communitarian organizations 
from distributing assets to departing members if they desire to do so.  
Distributions to departing members and distributions in liquidation of 
the communitarian organization must, however, be treated by 
departing members as dividends, taxable at the members’ ordinary 
rates.360 
 
 357  It is possible that the Tax Court’s definition is broad enough to incorporate 
communitarian groups that allocate other than strictly pro rata or pro rata according 
to some sense of merit.  But it would be worth explicitly stating that this is the case. 
 358  Prohibiting capital accounts may sufficiently demonstrate this lack of ongoing 
ownership. 
 359  See supra note 266 and accompanying text. 
 360  Treating distributions to departing members in distributions in liquidation of 
communitarian organizations as dividends potentially parts ways with ordinary 
corporate taxation.  A corporation can only pay dividends to the extent of its earnings 
and profits.  I.R.C. § 316(a) (2012).  To the extent that a distribution exceeds a 
corporation’s earnings and profits, a shareholder treats the excess as a return of capital 
to the extent of her basis in the shares, and as capital gain to the extent it exceeds her 
basis.  Id. § 301(c)(2)–(3) (2012).  Under section 501(d), though, distributions are not 
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Treating liquidating distributions as ordinary income differs from 
the tax consequences of dissociation in other entity tax regimes.  
Under the corporate income tax, for example, qualifying corporate 
distributions in redemption of a shareholder’s stock can be treated as 
payment in exchange for that stock.361  As a result, redeeming 
shareholders can qualify for advantageous capital gains rates on the 
amount they receive in excess of their basis.362  Because members of 
communitarian organizations do not have ownership interests in the 
organization or capital accounts, however, the idea of distributions 
constituting capital gain or return of capital is meaningless.  The Code 
should clarify that such distributions constitute dividends, however, to 
ensure that members of communitarian organizations do not try to 
treat liquidating distributions as tax-free or subject to preferential tax 
rates. 
C. Utopian Groups Are Poor Vehicles for Tax Evasion 
Congress would undoubtedly prefer that the broader availability 
of section 501(d) did not materially diminish federal revenue.363  One 
argument against the expansion of section 501(d) would be the risk 
that such expansion would encourage taxpayers to form 
communitarian organizations rather than standard C corporations to 
avoid the second layer of taxation.  To the extent that people favored 
these communitarian organizations, fewer taxable corporations would 
exist, which, in turn, could erode the corporate tax base.364  If, in fact, 
 
actually dividends; they are only “treated as a dividend received.”  Id. § 501(d) (2015).  
Because members of these communitarian organizations are not shareholders in the 
entity, their taxable income should not be constrained by the organization’s earnings 
and profits.  In the taxation of communitarian organizations, any liquidating 
distribution should be taxable to the departing member as if it were a dividend. 
 361  Id. § 302(a) (2010). 
 362  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 301(c)(2)–(3) (2012); Metzger Trust v. Comm’r, 76 T.C. 42, 49 
(1981) (“Section 302(a) treats such [redemption] distributions as ‘payment in 
exchange for the stock,’ taxable as capital gain.”), aff’d, 693 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1982).  
 363  If it did significantly reduce federal revenue, the federal government would 
have to raise taxes, either generally or on another group of taxpayers, to make up for 
the lost revenue, essentially causing other taxpayers to subsidize utopian groups.  
While such intra-taxpayer subsidies are permissible, there does not appear to be a 
compelling reason for subsidy in this case. 
 364  Similar concerns about widespread use of master-limited partnership sparked 
the enactment of the publicly traded partnership rules.  See, e.g., Susan Pace Hamill, 
The Taxation of Domestic Limited Liability Companies and Limited Partnerships: A Case for 
Eliminating the Partnership Classification Regulations, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 565, 577 (1995) 
(“[I]n 1987 Congress added section 7704 to the Code, which conclusively treats 
publicly traded partnerships as corporations for tax purposes.  This legislative 
determination of corporate status was based on the assumption that publicly traded 
partnerships eroded the corporate tax base.”) (internal footnotes omitted).  
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it would do so, that may be sufficient reason not to expand the 
availability of section 501(d).365 
However, people are unlikely to use communitarian organizations 
in a manner that would erode the corporate tax base.  Given that 
members of communitarian organizations exempt under section 
501(d) must pay taxes on their share of the organization’s income, 
whether or not the organization distributes its income,366 these 
organizations offer no way for individuals to defer their taxes.  With 
ordinary corporations, on the other hand, while the corporation pays 
taxes on its income, shareholders do not owe taxes until the 
corporation distributes its income to them.367  Under current law, when 
shareholders receive dividends from most U.S. and some foreign 
corporations, they pay taxes at preferential long-term capital gain 
rates.368  Members of communitarian organizations exempt under 
section 501(d), however, do not get the benefit of the preferential rate 
on dividends.369  Rather, they pay taxes on both actual and deemed 
dividends at their marginal tax rate.  While that marginal rate may be 
low for members of utopian communitarian organizations,370 people 
considering forming a communitarian group for tax-evasive purposes 
would likely pay taxes at higher marginal rates.  Such higher-income 
individuals have more incentive to structure their affairs to avoid taxes 
than do low-income individuals.371 
While section 501(d) provides that communitarian organizations 
and their members pay less collectively in taxes than if the organization 
were subject to the corporate income tax, exempting communitarian 
organizations from entity-level taxation does not meaningfully erode 
the tax base.  Religious and apostolic organizations exist primarily as a 
legal form to hold the communal property.  Without that legal form, 
communitarian groups could instead have members contribute the 
property to an individual or have them continue to hold title to the 
 
 365  Cf. Victor Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, 61 TAX L. REV. 89, 114 (2008) (“While 
certainly not a crime, there is something to be said for responding swiftly to new 
structures that erode the corporate tax base.”).  
 366  I.R.C. § 501(d) (2015). 
 367  Id. § 301(c)(1) (2012).  
 368  Id. § 1(h)(11) (2012). 
 369  Id. § 1(h)(11)(B)(ii)(I). 
 370  See, e.g., MILLER, THE 60S COMMUNES, supra note 134, at 34 (“By the prevailing 
standards of a relentlessly acquisitive society, Drop City was always an economic disaster 
area . . . .  To visitors, the place often seemed engulfed in poverty . . . .”). 
 371  Cf. Andrew Johns & Joel Slemrod, The Distribution of Income Tax Noncompliance, 
63 NAT’L TAX J. 397, 412 (2010) (“[W]hen taxpayers are arrayed by their estimated 
‘true’ income, the ratio of aggregate misreported income to true income generally 
increases with income.”).  
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property personally.  In either event, the tax law would not impose a 
second layer of taxation.  Either alternative form of ownership, while 
preferable to facing double taxation, represents a distortion in the 
members’ economic preferences.  These alternatives may also provide 
worse non-tax outcomes for members.  If an individual owned all of 
the property personally, for example, the members would have no 
substantial protection from that individual’s misuse of the property for 
her private benefit. 
D. Preventing Utopian Tax Evasion 
This is not to say, of course, that exempting utopian groups from 
entity-level taxation provides no opportunities for tax evasion.  There 
are two broad avenues that members of religious and apostolic 
organizations could use to exploit the exemption and illegitimately 
reduce their taxes.  The first is in the exchange of appreciated assets.  
If an individual transfers an appreciated asset in exchange for other 
assets, she must pay taxes on the unrealized appreciation.372  If, 
however, she contributes it to a communitarian organization, she 
recognizes no gain or loss on the property.373  The communitarian 
organization could then distribute it to another member of the group, 
ideally also tax-free. 
In fact, this type of transaction—called a “mixing bowl” 
transaction—can occur under subchapter K.374  Partners do not 
recognize gain on the contribution of appreciated property to a 
partnership.375  Likewise, neither a partnership nor its partners 
recognizes gain when the partnership distributes appreciated 
property.376  To combat these mixing bowl transactions, Congress 
enacted “a highly complex set of rules that distinguishes between 
partnership transactions and mixing bowl sales, with safe harbor 
periods, presumptions, exceptions, required risk allocations, allowable 
preferred returns, accommodation partner rules, and dozens of 
examples.”377 
Under the expanded definition of “common or community 
 
 372  Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (2015) (“[T]he gain or loss realized . . . from the 
exchange of property for other property differing materially either in kind or in 
extent, is treated as income or as loss sustained.”).  
 373  See, e.g., Campbell v. Prothro, 209 F.2d 331, 336 (5th Cir. 1954) (holding that 
gifting appreciated property does not constitute a realization event). 
 374  David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 863 (1999).  
 375  I.R.C. § 721(a) (2012). 
 376  Id. § 731(a) (1997). 
 377  See I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B) (2004), 707(a)(2)(B) (1986), 737 (2012); Weisbach, 
supra note 374, at 864. 
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treasury” I propose,378 however, religious and apostolic organizations 
would not need complex rules to police this type of tax evasion.  While 
contributing an appreciated asset to a communitarian organization 
would still not constitute a realization event, any distribution to 
another member would be taxable to that member.  So, while the 
donor could avoid paying tax, the recipient would pay tax on its full 
value (at ordinary rates), significantly reducing taxpayers’ incentives to 
abuse the communitarian form. 
The second type of tax evasion exempt communitarian 
organizations could facilitate is evasion of payroll taxes.  The 
allocations members receive from the communal organization are 
treated as dividends for tax purposes.  The I.R.S. has held that 
although members of religious or apostolic groups must include these 
deemed dividends in their gross income for federal income tax 
purposes, they do not need to include the deemed dividends in 
calculating their self-employment tax.379  Nor does the communitarian 
organization need to withhold payroll taxes.380 The ability to avoid 
these payroll and self-employment taxes represents real savings: under 
current law, these payroll taxes total 15.3 percent of an employee’s 
wages, with half paid by the employee and half by the employer.381  Self-
employed individuals are liable for the full 15.3 percent (of self-
employment, rather than wage, income) themselves.382 
To the extent an individual can transform her wage or self-
employment income into dividend income, then, she can significantly 
reduce her overall tax liability.  And to the extent she can control the 
allocations of a communitarian group, the structure of section 501(d) 
would allow her to do so.  At least some religious and apostolic groups 
use their allocations to replace paying wage income to their members, 
 
 378  See supra notes 358–362 and accompanying text. 
 379  Rev. Rul. 58-328, 1958-1 C.B. 327.  
 380  See Stahl v. United States, 626 F.3d 520, 526 (9th Cir. 2010) (“SHB [a religious 
or apostolic organization] does provide for all of the members’ personal needs, 
including food, clothing, housing, medical care, and education, but it does not treat 
those as wages (it does not pay payroll taxes for them).”).  
 381  Because of various ceilings and floors, certain taxpayers may owe more or less 
than 15.3 percent.  Broadly speaking, the employee’s share of Social Security taxes is 
6.2 percent of her wages, with an additional Medicare tax of 1.45 percent of those 
wages.  I.R.C. § 3010(a), (b) (2012).  Her employer owes an excise tax of an additional 
6.2 percent and 1.45 percent of her wages, respectively.  Id. § 3111(a)–(b) (2015).  The 
Social Security portion of the payroll taxes is capped, see id. § 3121(a)(1) (2014), but 
the Medicare tax is uncapped and, in fact, is increased by 0.9 percentage points on 
income above a certain amount.  Id. § 3101(b)(2) (2014). 
 382  Id. § 1401(a)–(b) (2014). 
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in spite of the members’ working for organization-owned businesses.383 
Any controlled pass-through entity risks transforming 
compensation for services into passive income, not subject to payroll 
taxes.  This risk is not purely theoretical.  In David E. Watson, P.C. v. 
United States, for example, an accountant formed a wholly-owned S 
corporation, which held his interest in the accounting firm he worked 
for.384  The S corporation paid him $24,000 a year for the two years at 
issue, and distributed the rest of his share of the firm’s income—
$203,651 and $175,470, respectively—as dividends.385  For non-tax 
purposes—and, for that matter, for income tax purposes—whether he 
received the income as salary or dividends made no difference.  But by 
shifting his income from wage income to dividend income, the 
accountant saved thousands of dollars in payroll taxes.386  Similarly, 
some argue that private investment fund managers use carried interest 
to convert compensation for services into passive income.387  This 
passive income is taxed at preferential rates, but it is also free from 
payroll taxes.388  By using pass-through entities to transform their active 
income into passive income, taxpayers can significantly reduce their 
net taxes. 
Even if Congress declines to expand the availability of section 
501(d) to non-religious communitarian organizations, it should 
provide the I.R.S. with explicit authority to prevent taxpayers from 
exploiting this loophole in the tax law.  Expanding the availability of 
section 501(d) would put more pressure on government revenues as 
more people could structure their affairs such that they were both 
members and employees of a communitarian group.  As employees, 
they could minimize their wage income, thus minimizing their payroll 
taxes.  As members, though, they could make up the lost wages 
 
 383  See Stahl, 626 F.3d at 526 (“[I]t cannot be doubted that SHB does not withhold 
taxes, including Social Security taxes, or withhold workers’ compensation or 
unemployment insurance.”).  
 384  Watson v. United States, 668 F.3d 1008, 1012 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 385  Id. at 1012–13. 
 386  Id. at 1013 (tax court imposed $23,431.23 of taxes, interest, and penalties).  This 
tax shelter is commonly known as the “John Edwards Shelter.”  Emily Ann 
Satterthwaite, Entry-Level Entrepreneurs and the Choice-of-Entity Challenge, 10 PITT. TAX 
REV. 139, 143 n.3 (2013). 
 387  See Samuel D. Brunson, Taxing Investment Fund Managers Using a Simplified Mark-
to-Market Approach, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 79, 101 (2010) (“[T]he debate [over carried 
interest] has so far focused on whether carried interest is a return to capital or to 
labor . . . .”).  
 388  Willard B. Taylor, Payroll Taxes—Why Should We Care? What Should Be Done?, 137 
TAX NOTES 983, 994 (2012) (“[A] consequence of treating [carried interest] as 
ordinary would make it subject to the tax on self-employment income.”) (footnote 
omitted).  
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through increasing their allocations.  While they would pay income 
taxes on the full amount at their marginal tax rates, they would not pay 
payroll taxes. 
Still, the dollar amounts at issue with this loophole are likely small, 
given both that communitarian organizations generally do not provide 
their members with significant amounts of income and given that 
relatively few communitarian organizations exist in the United States.  
Instead of further complicating section 501(d), the simplest way to 
prevent members of exempt communitarian organizations from 
exploiting this payroll tax (and other unforeseen types of tax evasion) 
would be to include an anti-abuse provision in the Code or in the 
Treasury regulations.389  That provision could provide the I.R.S. with 
the authority to recast a communitarian organization’s transactions if 
its transactions violated the purposes underlying section 501(d).390 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Because the tax law applies broadly to all U.S. taxpayers, it must 
calibrate its default assumptions to the economics facing most 
Americans.  For certain individuals and groups, though, such 
assumptions create bad results.  In those cases, it may be worth risking 
some additional complexity to accommodate the different economics. 
Congress has demonstrated, in enacting section 501(d), that it is 
capable of navigating this terrain.  Section 501(d) does an excellent 
job of reflecting the economics of many communal organizations, but, 
in its current form, it also leaves many stuck in the rules designed for 
participants in the United States’ default capitalism.  Among other 
 
 389  Anti-abuse rules are, in some ways, more problematic than bright-line rules.  For 
example, because of the vagueness inherent in an anti-abuse rule, they raise the costs 
of tax compliance.  Sheldon I. Banoff, The Use and Misuse of Anti-Abuse Rules, 48 TAX 
LAW. 827, 835–36 (1995).  As an alternative, Congress could require communitarian 
organizations to pay member-employees an arm’s-length salary.  Such a bright-line rule 
is complicated to administer, though.  The transfer pricing rules, for example, require 
transactions between related parties to have arm’s-length pricing.  Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
1(b)(1) (2015).  The regulations to implement those arm’s-length prices currently 
comprise 191 pages in the Code of Federal Regulations.  See 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.482-0--1.482-
9 (2016).  Compared with that level of complexity, the vagueness of an anti-abuse rule 
would likely impose less of an administrative burden on taxpayers than a bright-line 
rule. 
 390  This type of anti-abuse rule could be modeled after the subchapter K anti-abuse 
rule.  That rule, found in the Treasury regulations, first lays out the intent underlying 
subchapter K.  Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(a) (1995).  It then provides that, if a partnership 
is used in a way that violates that intent, the Commissioner has authority to “recast the 
transaction for federal tax purposes, as appropriate to achieve tax results that are 
consistent with the intent of subchapter K, in light of the applicable statutory and 
regulatory provisions and the pertinent facts and circumstances.”  Id. § 1.701-2(b). 
BRUNSON (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/2016  12:04 PM 
196 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:137 
things, it is available only to religious communitarian groups, its 
central qualification standards remain ambiguous at best, and the 
I.R.S. impedes even legitimate communitarian groups from using the 
regime by importing inapposite and unsupportable requirements into 
the regime. 
These impediments are entirely unnecessary, and should be 
eliminated.  If it does nothing else, Congress must clarify that religious 
and apostolic organizations are quasi-pass-through entities, not tax-
exempt entities.  The easiest way to accomplish this clarification would 
be to remove the tax regime applicable to communitarian 
organizations from section 501, which broadly governs tax-exempt 
organizations.  Without that immediate association, the I.R.S. will be 
better able to understand what the regime does, economically. 
But Congress should not stop with clarifying the nature of the tax 
regime.  It should also expand the availability of section 501(d) to any 
communitarian organization that has a common treasury and where 
members will include their share of the organization’s income in their 
gross income. 
Finally, in addition to expanding the availability of section 501(d), 
Congress needs to clarify the qualification requirements for the 
exemption.  Substantially unchanged after three-quarters of a century, 
some of the requirements remain ambiguous.  Other requirements 
imposed by the I.R.S. are unnecessary.  In any event, by clarifying the 
Code and reining in the I.R.S., Congress will lower the cost of entry 
into communitarian life without risking any significant erosion of the 
corporate tax base and without significantly diminishing its revenue. 
 
